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Introduction
Anxieties and Definitions
Introduction
Anxiety accompanies human/machine intersections. This condition is,
however, relatively new. Early work on machinic extensions of humans (men in
particular) for space travel occurred at roughly the same time as other forms of
technology, such as television, began to proliferate in everyday life. With the
increasing rate of this proliferation, some might say invasion, of technology, it is
now widely acknowledged the extent to which various forms of technology shape
our worlds. At times, this anxiety takes a phobic turn, questioning the extent to
which these technologies, as a whole, benefit human life on this planet:
In our more reflexive moments, we are suspicious that the 
technological instruments intended to heal and bring us together - 
the telephone, the automobile, the airplane, the computer, the fax 
machine, medical apparatus - are in truth driving us further apart. 
We fear that we are isolated bodies, plugged into technological 
toys and tools but divorced from the comforts of human proximity 
and touch. Even worse, the material products of technical- 
scientific reason have proliferated until they promise to transform 
the planet into a wasted metallic reflection of its misguided 
demigod. (Rushing and Frentz, 1995:13-14)
Fear of isolation and environmental degradation and anxiousness about the
possibility that an increased relationship with and/or reliance upon technology
might mean that humans cou/d not survive wAhouf machines; perhaps even that
human and machine are becoming integrated at the expense of pure'
humanness In short, the boundary between human and machine is becoming
blurred, if not eradicated. Terranova (2000) notes:
This mutation has been brought about, on the one hand, by the
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exposure to simulated images in the most traditional media, and, 
on the other, by the slow penetration into our daily life of almost 
invisible technological gadgets, from contact lenses to personal 
computers. This process of invasion' of the human body and 
psyche by the machine is destined to increase over the years (it is 
already doing it spectacularly) and give rise to a potentially new 
race of human beings whose symbiosis with the machine will be 
total. (270)
There is a foundation for this phenomenon of "treating the human form as a
problem to be solved by dis/assembly" to allow articulation with the machine
(Hayles, 1995:326), that stretches back to the early days of cybemetic research
in the middle part of the twentieth century. Dumit (1995) calls it "cyborg env/,
and defines it as:
a sociopathic condition which was formed around the interwar 
period and in conjunction with various military research programs 
and the assistance of a technophiliac popular media. It involves an 
apparatus of producing our selves as brain-function 
measurements, allowing deficient, normal, and even super levels 
to be demarcated.
In this condition, alongside stressful fears of the human species 
being outpaced by the world, appears the dream of individual 
technological redemption through making better humans. Now, to 
some extent we are all afflicted by the desire for technological 
enhancement, understanding our bodies as somewhat deficient 
cyborgs. (348)
As long ago as 1966, around the same time that work was t)eginning in earnest 
on amalgamating human and machine, it was noticed that "our relation to the 
machine has become quasi-symbiotic'' (Dechert, 1966:35). More contemporarily, 
Featherstone and Burrows (1995) have articulated various points along the 
continuum of human-machine fusions: "Atone end we have pure' human beings
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and at the other fully simulated disembodied post-humans which can only exist 
in cyberspace" (11). Moving away from the pure' human pole, they note.three 
stages in human-machine integration. First, the aesthetic manipulation of the 
body's surface (cosmetic surgery, muscle grafts, transplants from either humans 
or animals) which serve to blur the visual cues used for distinguishing between 
humans and non-humans as well as between genders. Second are the more 
fundamental alterations and/or enhancements of the functioning of the inner 
body and alternatives to replace organic functioning (biochip implants, upgraded 
senses, prosthetic additions). Featherstone and Burrows (1995) note that "both 
categories enable the body to t)e disassembled and reassembled with a high 
degree of functional specialization" (11). Finally, the third stage is that of 
"operators who move around in cyberspace and whose bodies are wired up to 
computers for input and output flows of information" (ibid.). It is the tension 
between the broad definitions that can be derived in part from these categories 
with which this thesis is concerned. On one hand there are physically embodied 
human-machine interfaces and on the other metaphoric cyborgs that do not 
physically exist. Baudrillard, as is further discussed throughout this thesis, 
claims that the human and the machine are already intertwined. ' This may be 
considered an instance of implosion. The tension resulting from the varying 
definitions of cyborg' with reference to the application of the theory of implosion 
is the main concern of this thesis.
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The relationship between humans and their environment, both natural and 
technological, is characterized as a form of denial: "We are a cyborg society of 
tools, machines, and organisms but we deny it. We deny our connection to the 
organic, and we deny responsibility for the technosciences that we make" (Gray, 
2002:194). What all of these observations about the various combinations of 
human and machine have in common is a confusion not only about the extent to 
which the relationship should be allowed to progress or exist, but also about what 
renders one a cyborg. The question asked by all, at one level or another, is this: 
Are humans becoming cyborgs? Or, have humans a/ready become cyborgs?
Definitions
An answer would require the fleshing out of what the terms 'human' and 
cytxyg' mean. It is also important to examine the process of becoming', 
particularly in the context of a melding of human and machine to bring about a 
new creature - what will here be taken to be the cyborg. 'Human', in this thesis, 
represents a loose and commonsense definition. No hairs will be split to exclude 
or include a particular trait or characteristic. Fetuses, the comatose, those kept 
alive by rneans otherthan their own, amputees, cognitively or physically impaired 
individuals and anyone who falls in t)etween or outside of these categories are 
included. Perhaps a definition of technology is also needed. Again, it is a broad
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and loose definition including everything from a simple walking stick or fork, as 
aids to human daily life, to complex mechanical devices like computers and cell 
phones, to nanotechnologies. In short, anything that humans have created to 
make life easier, longer, more pleasant, more far-reaching - tools of various 
description and in the broadest sense. Both of these definitions are meant to be 
as inclusive as possible so as to facilitate discussion not only of the widely 
varying definitions of cyborg' present in the academic literature but also to 
illustrate that regardless of the technology or definition of the human employed, 
the cyborg as a truly new and physically emtxxtied hybrid resulting from the 
collapse of the traditional binary of human and machine is a fiction.
A problem arises when examining the definitions of cyborg' that circulate
in academic literature on the subject. Featherstone and Burrows (1995), for
example, write that:
the term cyborg refers to cybemetic organism, a self-regulating 
human-machine system. It is in effect a human-machine hybrid in 
which the machine parts become replacements, which are 
integrated or act as supplements to the organism to enhance the 
body's power potential. (2)
Tomas (1995:21) calls the cyborg a radical vision of what it means to be human
in the late twentieth century. For Gray (2002), a cyborg does not even have to
involve the human since "any organism/system that mixes the evolved and the
made, the living and the inanimate is technically a cytx)rg".(2) His understanding
of a human cyborg is emphatic and extremely broad: "If you have been
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technologically modified in any significant way, from an implanted pacemaker to
a vaccination that reprogrammed your immune system, then you are definitely
a cyborg." (2)^  Gray further defines a semi-cyborg as "intermittent or temporary
human-machine symbiosis" (75) such as dialysis. Hayles (1995) picks up this
very broad definition, noting that:
Cyborgs actually do exist; about 10% of the current U .S. population 
are estimated to t)e cyborgs in the technical sense, including 
people with electronic pacemakers, artificial joints, drug implant 
systems, implanted comeal lenses and artificial skin. A much 
higher percentage participates in occupations that make them into 
metaphoric cytx)rgs, including the computer keyboarder joined in 
a cybemetic circuit with the screen, the neurosurgeon guided by 
fiber-optic microscopy during an operation, and the teen 
gameplayer in the local videogame arcade. (322)
The issue here is that the broadest of these definitions include too much to be
dealt with at once. The focus of this thesis will be on technologies that are of an
enduring physical quality (mechanical in some lasting way), and that are
concretely joined to the human body in one way or another. Metaphoric cyborgs
are a different matter altogether and are dealt with here only as counterpoints
to physical incarnations such as those discussed by Gray (2002) and others.
Wilson (1995) provides a definition of 'cyborg' that comes closer to the one that
will be primarily dealt with here:
I will become a cyborg, if only an absurd and inadequate one, 
when I bring together both a cybersystem (a widely diffused
1. Gray's definition is perhaps as broad as it is to make ttie issue of cytx)rg citizenship hit 
closer to home. See Gray, 2002.
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Structure of technological utilities) and a bodily system (a tightly 
interlaced web of physiological capacities, memories and 
mythology), forcing both networks of rhizomes to cohabit within my 
consciousness. (255)
'Cyborg', for the purposes of this thesis, will represent a figure that is based on
a human body that has physical technological elements appended/
attached/implanted for some functional purpose, and does not distinguish
between those who employ prosthetics for functional equivalence, such as
pacemakers or eyeglasses, and those who are prosthetically enhanced for some
other reason, more along the lines of 77?e Six W/ibn Oo//ar Man (1972, Dir.
Richard Moder). The uneven balance of power between the human and the
machine is at issue here. While it is the human that must incorporate the
machine, it is the machine that is often thought to be the stronger of the two (see
Chapter One). The gradual movement of prostheses from outside to inside the
human body acknowledges the unstable relationship between the human and the
machine. Indeed, it begs the question of who (or what) is eating' who? (see
Morse, 1994) The chapters that follow keep this idea of the cyborg in mind as
they examine two major points: first, the extent to which the human body and
technology, usually in one machinic form or another, intersect to create a hybrid
of the two; and second, the varying definitions of cyt)org' that are deployed, as
well as how these various usages of the term influence the interaction of humans
and all forms of their technology.
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Implosion
Because the relationship between humans and machines is coming to be 
seen more and more as one of indistinguishability in a physical rather than 
metaphorical sense, Baudrillard's (1983a, 1983b) notion of implosion is here 
employed as a conceptual tool to examine the extent to which this 
indistinguishability is actually represented by the incarnations of cyborgs 
presented in the following three chapters. Implosion can be loosely defined as 
the collapse of two poles into one another so that the differences that previously 
existed between them are no longer present. All flow between the two is also 
halted and made impossible as a result of the lack of distance between them. 
What was previously two becomes a hybrid, a unified one. It is not a matter of 
a whole being created in which elements of both parents' are identifiable; rather, 
what is created is completely new. Baudrillard (1983a) uses the example of the 
masses to make this point they absorb and neutralize meaning and any attempts 
made to make them make sense. Out of this inertia is created a hyperreality, 
which is a result of the masses' refusal to differentiate, to produce meaning from 
the signs presented to them. The black hole' that is the masses absorbs 
everything without distinction and diffuses it. If anything can t)e said to emerge 
from this, it is the indistinguishability that results. This argument can t)e 
extended to include the lack of distinction between subject and object, signifier
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and signified, the medium and the message, as well as mass and media (these 
examples will be further discussed in Chapter Four). In the case at hand, the 
human-as-subject and the machine-as-object would have to twist into one 
another so that this distinction, this binary, between subject and object, also 
disappears. If this were to occur, the result would be implosive.
Another justification, less important to the task at hand, for the usage of 
implosion as a theoretical model and tool is that Baudrillard himself appears to 
have taken the indistinguishability of human and machine as, perhaps, 
inevitable. In "Xerox and Infinity" (1988), Baudrillard notes that although this 
combination is at present stuck at the point of machines being prostheses, which 
could be said to be the mid-point of the spectrum of subject-object as it applies 
to implosion (more on this in Ch. 4), this is a relationship which is tx)und to 
become closer and closer until humans will have transferred all of their thought, 
intelligence, and gaze to the machine - a new and different definition of the 
cyborg. One that is still not implosive, but that points to a symbiotic relationship 
that cou/d reach the point of indistinguishability, and thus implosion, should the 
current track of progress' be followed.
What this thesis aims to do is debunk the myth of the physical cyborg-as- 
hybrid, that is, as an implosive figure. No matter what the human body or the 
technology employed, the end result is never a completely new creature, but 
rather one that is a very clear combination of human and machine. This will be
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accomplished by examining the deployment of the figure in several different 
discourses. What results from this examination is not a claim that these non- or 
quasi- cyborg figures lack value or importance, but rather, at present, that it must 
be remembered that a combination of human and machine is based first on the 
human body and second on technology. This means that the two are not 
inextricable, nor does the machine truly take over the human body. The reliance 
upon tools and other technologies may increase, but the price will not likely be 
the human species.
The Material
There are three different discourses to t)e examined in this thesis: (post) 
World War II military science, which pays special attention to the cybernetics 
work of Noitert Weiner; that of feminism, which takes as its starting point Donna 
Haraway's 1985 "Manifesto for Cyborgs" and continues its examination into the 
cyberfeminist literature; and that of media studies, which examines 
representations of the cyborg in film, television, print fiction, and performance art.
The three are related in several ways. The importance of the Internet for 
the cyt)erfeminist cyborg, for example, has ties to military research and history. 
Representations of militaristic cyborgs abound in film and television - Steve 
Austin (Six M#on Oo//ar Man) was a US Air Force test pilot and Robocop was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a police officer. Both maintain ties to their human lives even after becoming 
machinic humans. In addition, gender is a theme that runs through all three of 
the chapters. In the first, women are largely excluded from the discussion, 
whereas they are the focus of the second chapter. The third notes that there are 
differences in the representation of male and female cyborgs in various media. 
Issues of embodiment are present in each of the chapters as well: the adaptation 
of the (male) body for space travel is a focal point of Chapter One, but in Chapter 
Two, the emphasis is on the disembodied experience of women working in 
cyberspace. Embodiment enters the discussion in Chapter Three in the form of 
looking at the various representations of fictional cyborgs present in relatively 
contemporary media.
There are further similarities and differences between the three areas that 
are more specific than the themes outlined above. First, throughout all of the 
source material, there is a thread of purpose in the combination of human and 
machine, generally with the result of challenging the boundaries of convention. 
Adaptation for space travel and the myriad representations of enhanced-human 
crime fighters are the most obvious examples here, but this also applies to the 
feminist literature, particularly where the emphasis is on creating networks of 
women, that is, extending the conventional boundaries of communication. 
However, the treatment that the human body as a whole receives in each of the 
areas examined here varies. In post-war military science, the body was taken
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to be a whole but one that must be enhanced. The emphasis on joining 
individuals together in cyt)erfeminist discourse presents the body as isolated, 
whereas in many of the representations of the cyborg in the various media, the 
weakness of 'pure' human flesh is illustrated by the high resistance to injury of 
enhanced bodies. This is turn leads to another similarity: all of the areas 
examined here not only take a human-centred approach to the problem but also 
betray an underlying current of individualism by attempting to create a human 
that can survive in space by wearing a suit or by implying that one individual can 
certainly make a difference in their surroundings when armed with technology, 
be it in creating a global network of women or getting rid of neighbourhood 
nuisances. The optimism with which the combination of human and machine is 
greeted varies among these three areas. Where early twentieth century military 
science enthusiastically embraced the possibilities of this new union, feminists 
approached it more critically by exposing the uses to which technology is put 
while adopting specific technologies as tools of daily life. Popular culture and 
other mediatic representations of the cyborg depict both optimistic and 
pessimistic outcomes of the combination of human and machine.
It is within feminist discourse and the contemporary mediatic 
representations of the cyborg that the metaphoric cyborg dwells. This is a 
creature that is not literally joined to technology but one that is instead 
increasingly reliant on it. This, perhaps, can be considered the closest to an
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instance of implosion in the Baudrillardean sense. Because, however, a number 
of different definitions of cytx)rg' circulate, the challenge here is to determine the 
extent to which this implosion can t)e grafted on to physical examples of 
human/machine combinations that are labelled 'cyborg'.
Method
The choice of these three areas over others was made primarily on the basis of 
prominence of the figure of the cyborg. They also attempt to provide a rough 
chronology of the evolution of both the figure and the uses to which it is put, 
beginning with post-World War II military science, which can be considered the 
starting point of North American work on the subject. Feminist discourse, 
considered here in Chapter Two, provides the first major critical examination and 
theoretical use of the figure and thus requires exploration here. It also makes 
extensive use of the cyborg as metaphor, which provides a useful counter­
example to the physical incarnations exposed in both Chapters One and Three. 
Finally, because the cyborg is an increasingly present figure in popular culture, 
the uses to which it is put in various media are also important to investigate. 
What the choice of these three areas is meant to convey is the wide-ranging use 
of the figure of the cyborg as a combination of human and machinic elements. 
Because each of these areas deal with the cyborg as such a combination
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(although with differing attitudes ranging from military science's enthusiasm to 
feminism's wariness to the mixed messages conveyed by the many media 
sources which employ the figure), Baudrillard's idea of implosion is important to 
examine given that his metaphoric use of the concept fits with a metaphoric 
definition of 'cyborg' but may not fit well with a more literal one. Other human- 
machine combinations were left out, particularly those where a machine serves 
as a replica or simulation of a human, such as androids and human-shaped 
robots, for reasons of space and clarity. An examination of the various stages 
of the evolution of the cyborg from robot form would be, as Gonzalez (2000) 
discusses, a very dense (and lengthy) project. It is by beginning with the point 
at which humans sought to integrate machinic elements into their functioning that 
the scope of the project was limited.
The sources used in this project were not predetermined and are by no 
means exhaustive. By beginning with a few texts from each of the fields, it was 
possible to determine what the key texts were. Those texts that perhaps should 
have been included in the current discussion but did not make it were, more 
likely than not, left out because of either space or oversight. The method of 
research used dealt mostly with reading and searching to fit together the pieces 
that seemed so disparate at the beginning of the project. The major themes that 
arose from investigation into the uses of the figure of the cytx)rg, and which will 
be here discussed, are largely the same as those given above. Each chapter
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does pick out other themes with which to deal, but these are largely brought out 
to clarify other, broader, themes.
Overall, what this project seeks to do is examine the lineage of the figure 
of the cyborg from its beginnings in mid-twentieth century military science 
through its usage in socialist feminist and cyt)erfeminist discourse to popular 
mediatic representations. The goal is to expose the figure as not one of hybridity 
or novelty, but as fantasy, for good or evil, of the amalgamation of human and 
machine into a new, implosive, embodied creature. Just as the very word 
'cyborg' was a neologism resulting from the joining of'cybernetic' and 'organism', 
so too is the reality of the joining of human and machine; the boundary and 
difference between the two still exists and is often plainly visible and painfully 
obvious.
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Introduction
It has been said that contemporary humans often behave "as if we were 
cybemetic organisms - confusing the mechanical and the organic, the inner and 
outer realms, simulation and reality, even omnipotence and impotence" (Levidow 
& Robins, 1989:7). This is hardly surprising when one considers that the 
language employed to discuss much of human behaviour frequently takes a 
mechanistic turn. An example: "The human being is under constant threat to its 
survival, the threat being recognised as that, primarily, of uncertainty. The 
human being has to be p/ogrammedto continually minimise the uncertainty with 
which it is beset” (Brix, 1967:106, emphasis mine). Other, more contemporary, 
sources take this human-as-machine thought even further: "Technologies are 
human beings fused to their niche. Technologies are an osmosis, the intelligent 
matter that inseminates and intertwines itself into the human" (Dyens, 2001:8). 
What both of these examples imply is that humans are limited in their capacities, 
that they need to be augmented, as in the space exploration applications of 
cybemetic technology; extended, as in McLuhan's idea of the various media 
acting as extensions of man (McLuhan,1964)\ even improved by technological
1. In a 1951 letter McLuhan distinguished his theory of communication as participation from 
others, including Weiner, whose theories are transmissional. McLuhan considered these 
other theories to be lacking in that they failed to "understand the techniques and functions of 
the traditional arts as the essential type of all human communication” (Theall, 2001:60). 
Theall (2001) notes that “[McLuhan’s] view of communication as a shared process of human 
making - of producing and reproducing cultural works (one of the leading forms being 
conversation) - recognizes the collective aspect of social communication" (61).
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assistance, as in the case of vaccination and/or immunization practices.
With specific reference to post-World War Two cybernetic and military 
science discourse, this chapter will examine the 'need' to create a new kind of 
human, one which functions in alignment with the technologies which surround 
him or, increasingly, her.^  Special attention will be paid to the work of Norbert 
Weiner, a founding figure in the field of cybernetics. His vision for cybernetics, 
made clear in the subtitle of his Cybemef/cs; Confro/ and Commun;caf/on /n the 
An/ma/ and the Macb/ne (originally published in 1948), was a "program of inquiry 
that would extend the use of concepts and techniques of proven value in the 
physical sciences and technologies to the life sciences and eventually to the 
study of society” (Rosenblith, 1967:271). He based his work on the similarities he 
detected between control mechanisms and communicational organizations found 
in machine systems  ^ and analogous systems in living organisms (Tomas, 
1995a:27). Weiner recognized that the potential for negative effects arising from 
his work did exist, should the technologies he pioneered fail to be humanistic.
The key theme of this chapter is the view of the human body as a 
machine, that is, with discrete parts that could possibly be substituted for
1. Since the bulk of this chapter deals with an era of science and technology that excluded 
women, the use of ‘man’ or 'men' is meant to denote the male human rather than 
‘mankind’ or ‘humans'.
2. For purposes of clarity, the following definitions will be employed throughout this chapter: 
System: “an organized collection of interrelated elements characterized by a boundary and 
functional utility.” (Dechert, 1966: 23); Interface: an area of contact between one system and 
another (Dechert, 1966)
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machinic parts. Toward this end, mid-twentieth century military science worked 
first to replicate the functioning of various human body parts, such as the brain, 
and then to replace or enhance those parts in the human with their machinic 
counterparts. As is further discussed below, Weiner's goal with his work in 
prosthetics was to do just this. He wanted human and machine to function as a 
single unit in a self-regulating feedback loop. More contemporary 
representations of the figure of the cyborg betray this beginning in that they 
portray these individuals, or 'units' as functioning. This is particularly true of the 
razorgirl Molly in William Gibson's A/euromancer (1984) - she has not only 
integrated machinic elements into her body, but her reflexes have been upgraded 
to allow the blades beneath her fingernails, for example, to respond to her 
nervous system. It is also the case that this type of addition to the human body 
exists today in the form of pacemakers and other internal mechanics, but neither 
the fictional representations northe embodied prosthetics move beyond the early 
work of cyberneticians - simulating and replacing a body part or appending one 
that did not exist previously does not cause the loss of the distinction between 
human and machine.
For the purposes of this discussion, it is important to note that both military 
science and initially non-military science appropriated for military uses frequently 
result in technologies being developed pnman/y m/Z/fary purposes. This 
chapter deals with both types of science and technology to illustrate that a non-
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military science and/or technology with explicitly humanistic  ^goals (i.e. Weiner's 
cybernetics) may be seized upon by military interests, the efforts of which result 
in a mutation of those goals to decidedly anti-humanistic ones. Finally, the 
chapter also examines the disjunctures present within this era of science and/or 
technology with respect to efforts to simulate human functions, as well as to the 
creation of (or lack thereof) seamless human-machine interfaces.
History, Feedback, and the Body
The word 'cybernetics' is derived from the Greek kybemefes meaning 
steersman (Dechert, 1966) and, according to Weiner (1961), does not date back 
any further than 1947. This field, an interdisciplinary study of self-regulation in 
animals and machines, began ata 1942 meeting in New York sponsored by the 
Josiah Macy Foundation (Dechert, 1966). The result of the meeting was the first 
paper dealing with the topic, entitled "Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology", written 
by Weiner, Arturo Rosenbluth and Julian Bigelow. In it, they distinguished 
between examining an entity based on functional analysis and an examination 
based on a behaviouristic approach. "[w]e conjectured that the mechanism of 
voluntary activity was of a feedback nature, and accordingly, we sought in the 
human voluntary activity for the characteristics of breakdown which feedback
3. Humanisitic will here be taken to mean large-scale “human interests, needs, values, and 
principles”, rather than those qualities defined for specific interests.
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mechanisms exhibit when they are overloaded" (Weiner, 1967: 223-4).
The concept of feedback is key in cybernetics, and is one that predates
the field. Sadie Plant notes that the governor, an early system of machine
regulation or limitation, similar to those found on automobiles' speedometers
today, may have been the first feedback machine:
Perhaps the first cybernetic machine was the governor, a basic 
self-regulating system, which, like a thermostat, takes the 
information feeding out of the machine and loops or feeds it back 
on itself. Rather than a linear operation, in which infonnation 
comes in, is processed and goes out without any retum, the 
cybernetic system is a feedback loop, hooked up and responsive 
to its own environment. (Plant, 1995:53)
Because the information that is processed is looped back into the system, it is
useful to consider the cybernetic feedback loop as a trial and error exercise.
Trials inevitably provide errors which are then used to improve the next trial (Brix,
1967). This is, for the most part, the same system employed by organizations to
organisms and beyond, in their effort to survive (Brix, 1967). Brix (1967:
foreword, n.p.) notes that "almost anything that has dynamic characteristics and
which responds to external circumstances can be analysed by cybernetic
methods." This view, evident in the work of many of Brix's contemporaries, does
much to account for the mechanistic view of the human body that wpuld develop
within cybernetic (and other) discourse.
This image of the human body as machine figures heavily in early 
cybernetic research. The literature surrounding research in the field was focussed 
primarily on making connections between living organisms and machine systems
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(see Weiner, 1967:38). In the very earliest research the emphasis was on 
parallels between the two rather than the creation of an interface between them, 
although efforts were made toward this end. The discourse was phrased in 
terms of the application of mechanical language to human bodily functions: 
"Cybemetics[...] proposed a radically different solution to the fundamental nature 
of the human organism by proposing that its Being be reduced to an 
organizational paffem whose operational logic was also co-extensive with other 
organisms and types of machine systems" (Tomas, 1995a:27-8). At the same 
time, however, Weiner points out that "cybernetics takes the view that the 
structure of the machine or of the organism is an index of the performance that 
may be expected from it" (Weiner, 1967:79). The implication of this viewpoint is 
that although cybernetic methods may be applied to the study of anything that 
both possesses dynamic characteristics and responds to external stimuli, there 
may, in many cases, be lowered expectations from an organism than from a 
machine, despite the application of machinic language to organic forms. An early 
branch of cybernetic research, teleoperations, illustrates this. Although "a 
teleoperator is a genera/ purpose, dexterous, cybemet/c mac/i/ne," the 
mechanical elements added to the organism, in this case human, arp for the sole 
purpose of augmenting "a normal man, or in the case of prosthetics, helps a 
handicapped man become more nearly normal"  ^(Johnsen & Corliss, 1995:84-5).
4. Prosthetic devices are a source of great discussion in the academic literature in this field, 
and will thus be examined later in this paper, especially in Chapters 2 and 4.
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The organism must be supplemented by the (superior) machine for it to become 
superior itself.
The Mind and the Machine
One of the peculiarities of cybernetics that became increasingly apparent 
as work progressed was the fact that all efforts to find parallels between humans 
and machines succeeded only in finding similarities between machines built for
a specific purpose and narrowly defined functions of the human body. The
metaphor of the machine being applied to the body provided a vision of the body
as machine, separable into many discrete parts each with its own function.
McLuhan points out that this is not a new phenomenon:
It is one of the mysteries of cybernation that it is forever challenged 
by the need to simulate consciousness. In fact, it will be limited to 
simulating specialist activities of mind for some time to come. In 
the same way, our technologies have for thousands of years 
simulated not the body but fragments thereof. (McLuhan, 
1966:101)
This imitation of consciousness is something that has preoccupied the field of
cybernetics from the very beginning (Roszak, 1986), but has frequently been
seen as limited, even 'blinkered':
To simulate the functions of the brain by a machine is to make a 
machine which processes information in order to secure the 
survival of a biological organism of which it is an integral part, not 
to mention the species to which the biological organism belongs. 
Until someone has some specific ideas about how to build a 
machine of this type, it seems advisable to stop talking about
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
Chapter 1
(Post) World War II Military Science
mechanical simulation of the human brain. (Taube, 1961:77)
Roszak's interpretation of the project of simulated consciousness is slightly more
optimistic, but is still firmly within the argument that full simulation is yet to come:
The human mind has been on the agenda of the mechanists since 
the first crude clockwork models of mentality appeared in the 
eighteenth century. Now that paradigm of intelligence has matured 
along with our technology into the data processing model of 
thought. The mind in all its aspects can now be seen as 'nothing 
but' a rather complicated information-shuffling machine that works 
up its highest powers from simple, formal procedures that organize 
data points. And just as the ultimate proof of the mechanistic 
model in medicine is the invention of a mechanical heart or kidney 
that will sustain life, so in cognitive science the effort is to invent a 
machine that will convincingly imitate the highest functions of the 
minds [sic] - its power to reason, to judge, to decide. (Roszak, 
1986: 207)
This passage is worth quoting at length to illustrate not only the piecemeal efforts
at imitating various parts of the body, but also the divisions within the scientific
sector, each part of the body being left to a different area of specialism. Although
the whole endeavour may be covered by the umbrella term 'cybernetics', the
various branches of scientific research were, at this time, still functioning for the
most part in isolation from one another. Indeed, there were dissenters to the
utopian vision of simulated consciousness and human functions, citing
shortcomings on both sides of the human-machine dichotomy:
The view being advanced here, in contradistinction to the prevalent 
view, is that there are radical and basic discontinuities between 
digital computers and living organisms; that the essential 
characteristics of living organisms cannot be simulated, copied, 
imitated, or surpassed by machines. It is also true that the 
essential characteristics of machines cannot be profitably copied, 
simulated, or imitated by living organisms. (Taube, 1961:84)
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Taube's overall argument is that the goal of simulation should be eliminated in 
favour of examination of the idea of the machine extending the function of the 
brain and processing information it would not ordinarily be able to handle into 
forms that it may (Taube, 1961:77). He also points out another vital area of 
concern, and one which has not been adequately addressed: "If human functions 
are to be replaced by machines, the basic requirement is an understanding of 
human functions" (Taube, 1961:95-96). This is especially important with respect 
to simulated consciousness, given that the human brain has yet to be decoded, 
but should also be taken into consideration in regards to other simulated human 
functions.
Weiner and Cybernetics
'Cybernetics' and the various scientific apparatuses it spawned are 
generally considered to be modem Western creations (Tomas, 1995). The field 
grew rapidly after the Second World War, and especially after the publication of 
Weiner's Cybemef/cs. Conbo/ and Commun/cabon /n fbe An/ma/ and fbe 
Macb/ne in 1948. A later edition of Weiner's Tbe Human L/se of Human Be/ngs 
(1967, originally published 1950) included an afterword by one of his colleagues 
in which Weiner's goals and visions for the field are discussed: "His hope was 
that Cybemef/cs would provide a common approach to the study of 
communication and control processes in machines, organisms, and societies,
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and that this approach would enhance human dignity rather than defile it" 
(Rosenblith, 1967).
This vision for the future of cybernetics still included the idea that the 
field's primary purpose was an "interdisciplinary inquiry into the nature and 
physical basis of human intelligence with the object of reproducing it 
synthetically" (Singh, 1966:5). Thus, the description of 'cybernetic' excluded "all 
preprogrammed machinery, such as time-controlled ovens, record-changing 
phonographs, and much of the machinery of automatic production lines" 
(Johnsen & Corliss, 1995: 85), a general definition that has existed to this day 
(see Mann & Niedzviecki, 2001). True cybernetic organisms always had man in 
the feedback loop. Although man is always included in the self-regulating 
feedback loop, this loop "must function without the benefit of consciousness in 
order to cooperate with the body’s own autonomous homeostatic controls” 
(Clynes & Kline, 1995: 30). Once again, man was considered inadequate to 
consciously regulate the functions of the machinery with which he would be 
augmented, thus placing the machine in a superior position, since it if the 
machine regulates itself as a part of a system which includes the human body, 
it also regulates, to a certain extent, the body. Weiner himself was qf the opinion 
that man's place in the feedback loop was vital since at the time the functioning 
of those machines capable of 'learning' or modifying their operation based on 
previous operation and its results had not been perfected.
Certain kinds of machines and some living organisms - particularly
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the higher living organisms - can, as we have seen, modify their 
patterns of behaviour on the basis of past experience so as to 
achieve specific anti-entropic ends. In these higher forms of 
communicative organisms the environment, considered as the past 
experience of the individual, can modify the pattem of behaviour 
into one which in some sense or other will deal more effectively 
with the future environment. (Weiner, 1967:67)
Weiner began with the notion that there are massive analogies between
control functions in men and machines (Taube, 1961). His work
provides a useful overview of different phases in the development 
of automata. His periodization is of interest because of its focus on 
shifts in motive force and the way that these shifts are related to 
parallel history of the body [...]Weiner"s two-fold periodization is 
significant because it reveals an awareness, by one of the principle 
founders of cybernetics, of important disciplinary phases in a 
machine-based history of the western body. It is also significant 
because it draws attention to pam/Ze/ phases in the body's 
functional reimaging as a fundamental element in a machine 
culture. (Tomas, 1995a:23)
The being that Weiner envisioned was conceived as an “active, hierarchically
governed, self-regulated and goal oriented machine” and “marked a new
threshold of intelligence, which extended beyond that which has been previously
established on the basis of automated, factory-based machine systems” (Tomas,
1995a:25). This entity was based on Weiner's taking note of the fact that there
is a relationship between the feedback (as well as other) systems dynamics in
artificial and natural systems (Gray, 2002). Gray points out that "this is what
makes the cyborg possible - communication across the divide between the living
and the inanimate.” (Gray, 2002:179)
Part of the reason that Weiner's work is important is because he himself
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acknowledged that there are ramifications of human practice on the external
environment: "We have modified our environment so radically that we must now
modify ourselves in order to exist in this new environment. We can no longer live
in the old one. Progress imposes not only new possibilities for the future but new
restrictions” (Weiner, 1967:66). It is unlikely that a founding figure of cybemetics
would have made a statement contrary to this one since it so enthusiastically
supports work being done in the field, but Weiner did acknowledge the potential
for ill-effects resulting from cybernetics (see Weiner, 1961). He seemed, at
times, unsure of how the (then) very mathematical field of cybemetics would be
used in the social sciences, while at the same time being aware of the possible
limitations of work in the area. His "expectations of cybernetics are definitely
tempered by an understanding of the limitations of the data which we may hope
to obtain” (Weiner, 1961:25). As is mentioned above, Weiner was hopeful that
cybemetics would have practical applications, particularly conceming prostheses
for lost or paralysed limbs. An extended quote from Cybemef/cs (1961) serves
to illustrate clearly what Weiner hoped would result from the field:
The loss of a segment of limb implies not only the loss of the purely 
passive support of the missing segment or its value as mechanical 
extension of the stump, and the loss of the contractilq power of its 
muscles, but implies as well the loss of all cutaneous and 
kinesthetic sensations originating in it. The first two losses are 
what the artificial-limbmaker now tries to replace. The third has so 
far been beyond his scope. In the case of a simple peg leg, this is 
not important: the rod that replaces the missing limb has no 
degrees of freedom of its own, and the kinesthetic mechanism of 
the stump is fully adequate to report its own position and velocity. 
This is not the case with the articulated limb with a mobile knee and
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ankle, thrown ahead by the patient with the aid of his remaining 
musculature. He has no adequate report of their position and 
motion, and this interferes with his sureness of step on an irregular 
terrain. There does not seem to be any insuperable difficulty in 
equipping the artificial joints and the sole of the artificial foot with 
strain or pressure gauges, which are to register electrically or 
otherwise, say through vibrators, on intact areas of skin. The 
present artificial limb removes some of the paralysis caused by the 
amputation but leaves the ataxis. With the use of proper receptors, 
much of this ataxia should disappear as well, and the patient 
should be able to learn reflexes, such as those we all use in driving 
a car, which should enable him to step out with a much surer gait. 
(Weiner, 1961:26)
Thus, although he was working in a predominantly mathematical field, Weiner's 
interests in and hopes for cybemetics clearly betray a rather humanistic vision 
of where the field would or should go. It is important to recognize that for all the 
optimism of the field at this time, the problem of fragmented simulation of human 
parts and functions by machines as well as the polarity of the human and the 
machine remained foregrounded.
Military Applications and the Space Race
Later, cybemetics began to move from the margins of science and 
technology to the forefront of the military-industrial complex. In 1962, Kline and 
Clynes were working on a way to adapt man to space travel. According to 
Clynes (1995:35), "the concept of the cyborg was to allow man to optimize his 
intemal regulation to suit the environment he may seek.” At this time the
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environment that was being sought was outer space. The 'space race' provided 
part of the impetus for the popularized version of man-machine systems, that 
began to appear at the time. Tomas (1995a:35) argues that this could be traced 
to the fact that this combination "reintroduced mimesis in the shape of 
anthropomorphism back into the history of automata.”
The man-machine identity that was lacking in early cybemetic work began 
to come to the fore with the involvement of various military establishments 
around the world, but specifically that of the United States. This identity is 
"achieved not by attributing human attributes to the machine, but by attributing 
mechanical limitations to man. From one point of view, it doesn't matter very 
much whether the leveling is down or up, so long as the end of the process is the 
assertion of man-machine identity” (Taube, 1961:42-43). While this may be the 
case, that the direction of the levelling does not matter as long as the interface 
is there, the fact remains that where there is an interface, the machine must be 
adapted to serve the needs of the human involved. In the case of prostheses, 
the machine not only fits with the human body but also s/mu/afes the appearance 
of the human fbnn, if only part of it. By the time that Clynes and Kline were 
working on the cyborg idea, the sense of man adapting hirpself to the 
environment had been supplanted by an increased estimation of the function of 
the machine. The point of the cyborg, according to Clynes and Kline (1995:31), 
is that it "deliberately incorporates exogenous components extending the self- 
regulatory control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new
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environments.” This betrays the feeling at the time, partially brought on by the 
developments in computer technology, that the 'grunt work' should be performed 
by machines where possible, thus allowing man to be Tree to explore, to create, 
to think, and to feel.” (ibid.)^  It is presumably this model that allowed Neil 
Armstrong to utter the now-famous words upon landing on the moon rather than 
having to concentrate on the control system that was keeping him alive in the 
new environment of Earth's moon.
There is, however, no way to completely remove man from the feedback
loop. But there is also little possibility of removing machines from endeavours to
explore, for example, outer space.
Like any scientific model, cybemetics must create an ideal, 
imaginary, world in order to impose its order on the real world. Yet 
it is impossible to design a system that perfectly simulates and
anticipates the real-world events that it is assigned to control. 
Moreover, despite heroic attempts to adapt humans perfectly to 
such elaborate systems, people often resist such adaptation. 
(Levidow & Robins, 1989: 8)
Thus, if humans are to continue their efforts to free themselves from the confines
of Earth's landmass ,^ there must, at some point, be machine involvement to allow
humans to explore without being perfectly suited themselves to enter these new
ô.There is, however, some debate as to the actual role of computers in cybernetics. Writing 
in the same year (1966), Diebold asserts that computers are not at the heart of the field, 
while Dechert maintains that computers are important to cybernetics because “they oblige us 
to sort out vague ideas and feelings from clearly formulated univocal ideas and relations if 
we wish to manipulate them by machine" (1966:4).
7. ‘Earth’s landmass’ is here used due to the equally foreign environments of outer space and 
deep ocean exploration.
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environments. Machines used for this purpose are truly prostheses in that they 
improve and expand the functioning of completely human systems.
An important area of cybemetic research was, and still is, in the 
application of cybemetic systems to weapons. The idea, developed almost forty 
years ago, that the "most sophisticated man-machine systems today are basically 
extenders of human perceptive, data processing, and motor capabilities” 
(Dechert, 1966:30), still figures heavily into the weapons systems being 
developed to integrate military men (and now, women), their tools (such as auto­
pilot functions), and their weapons. Robins and Levidow (1989) note with regard 
to computer-based instruction, particularly of soldiers, that
Human performance is redefined according to cognitive models 
derived from weapons systems, where the priority is to optimize the 
system's potential. Human thinking, memory, problem-solving and 
learning are modelled after their anthropomorphic counterparts in 
machine intelligence systems. Beneath its benign veneer, such 
education serves at once as laboratory, production site and 
legitimation for this military-based agenda, which in turn is 
increasingly writ large as a military information society. (9)
There is here a strong parallel to the training of new model soldiers to at least act
like machine augmented humans if they cannot be actual cyborgs in the sense
of a combination of organic and machinic (see Gray, 1989:44). However, there
is a problem here: how precisely does one act like a cyborg? What do cyborgs
act like? Within the military scientific discourse, a cyborg is generally taken to
mean a human being enhanced in some fashion through the use of technology
but what statements like the above betray is essentially the ultimate dream of
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capitalism superimposed onto a militaristic system: a perfectly efficient, obedient, 
tireless, and indestructible worker/soldier whose production is without loss and 
without entropy. That is not, however, a cyborg. It is instead a robot.^  So long 
as humans are included in the feedback loop of what are still essentially 
cybemetic systems, this robot-dream will remain a phantasy.
Human/technological systems are not myths. Cybemetics was
appropriated by various military projects very early in its development for the
purpose of developing weapons systems composed of human/machine feedback
loops. Chris Hables Gray (1989) explains that
weapons have always played an important role in war, from before 
the Greek hoplite to the tankers of the world wars. Today, 
however, it is not just that the soldier is influenced by the weapons 
used; not he or she is (re)constructed and (re)programmed to fit 
integrally into weapons systems. The basic currency of war, the 
human body, is the site of these modifications - whether it is of the 
'wetware' (the mind and hormones), the 'software' (habits, skills, 
disciplines) or the ‘hardware’ (the physical body). To overcome the 
limitations of yesterday's soldier, as well as the limitations of 
automation as such, the military is moving towards a more subtle 
man/machine integration: a cybemetic organism ('cyborg') model 
of the soldier that combines machine-like endurance with a 
redefined human intellect subordinated to the overall weapons 
system. (43)
World War Two had a fair amount to do with this branch of cybemetic 
research. Some point to the military for an example of the first cyborg (using, of
8. Baudrillard’s second order of simulation is represented by the robot. It is, at root, a worker, 
bearing no resemblance to humans. Production is the dominant principle of the robot; all 
relation to a ‘real’ worker has been abolished and its only truth is in its mechanical efficacy. 
(Baudrillard,1983b:92-95)
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course, a looser definition of cyborg' than did those involved with cybernetics
work of the time period) with World War Two as the apex (see Gray, 1989).
Psychologists and engineers, working together during the war to respond to
problems faced by pilots and operators dealing with increasingly complex
weapons, attempted to design weapons that better fit with the limitations and
abilities of humans (in this case, men). What was developed was "a single
operating unit, a new hybrid of man and machine” (Noble, 1989:18). As time has
progressed, the goal has now become to
develop biochips that can be activated by hormones and neural 
electrical stimulation and which can, in tum, initiate hormonal and 
mental behavior in humans. It is hoped that such human-machine 
integration will result in quicker reaction times, better
communication, improved control and greater reliability overall. 
(Gray, 1989:53)
Should this goal be realized, it will signal a reversal: it is now the human in the 
system that will be altered, whether physically, mentally, or pharmacologically, to 
fit the needs of the machine rather than the other, traditional, way around. 
Ideally, the military wants to engineer the human element in weapons systems 
in the same way that it designs and engineers the hardware and software 
components of such systems (Noble, 1989). This appears to be a concept taken 
from the work of Clynes and Kline (1995): that the adaptation of man rather than 
changing the environment opens new possibilities for human exploration. They 
were speaking of space, but the same can be said of the environment as 
weapons hardware in contemporary military machinery.
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Perhaps this idea is not far off. Contemporary representations of the 
cyborg provide a quasi-military vision of the figure that appears to involve the 
modification of the human to fit the weapon. Films such as the Term/nafor series 
(Dir. James Cameron, 1984,1991; Dir. Jonathan Mostow, 2003), the Robocop 
series (Dir. Paul Verhoeven, 1987; Dir. Irvin Kershner, 1990; Dir. Fred Dekker, 
1992) and countless B-movies (the Cyborg Cop series [Din Sam Firstenberg, 
1988, 1994], Cybo/g2 [Dir. Michael Schroeder, 1988]), as well as television 
representations such as Tbe Srx M#on Do/Zar Man (Dir. Richard Irving, 1972) 
and Tbe BZonZc l/Vbman (Dir. Richard Moder, 1975) illustrate not only a hyper- 
rriasculine cyborg but also inform the relationship between men and machines 
in the popular imaginary. The men in these films are generally highly trained as 
police officers, killing machines, or armed forces personnel who have undergone 
either physical or mental transformations of some kind to make them more 
'efficient', often for the purposes of mass destruction. Despite the apparently 
seamless union of man and weapon, these representations maintain a cybemetic 
vision of a man-machine system.
Early cybemetic discourse, for all its essentially utopian visions of the 
interface between human and machine, is, at root, based on the opposZZZon rather 
than ZnZegraZZon of the two. This is not to say that the integration of organic and 
non-organic is impossible; Taube, writing in 1961, acknowledges this: "There is 
first the opposition between human and machine, which is sometimes expressed 
as an opposition between the physiological and the mechanical. It is certainly
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possible to say that at a deeper philosophical level this opposition disappears” 
(2-3). As the discourse evolves and even mutates into other fields where the 
figure of the cyborg is used more as a metaphor than a physical construct, or as 
both, this fundamental opposition gradually changes into a more flexible 
interface. Indeed, the very definition of the word 'cyborg' changes, moving from 
a rigid interpretation based solely on cybemetics work to one which considers a 
much looser relationship between the human and the technological to be worthy 
of the descriptor/title ‘cyborg’.
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Introduction
Weaving has been called the original woman-machine interface (Plant, 
2000a). This image is frequently employed by cyberfeminists to describe the 
activities of contemporary women and technology, particularly with reference to 
cyberspace and/or the Intemet and/or virtual reality (VR) (Wakeford, 2000).^ 
Following Haraway (1985), the figure of the cyborg is often employed in this 
discourse as a means of describing the new being that emerges from the 
intertwining of women and technology, a figure which accepts new technologies 
as tools like any other and gets on with the business of using them (Plant, 2000; 
Soper, 1999) - in short, a metaphorical incarnation of the cyborg rather than a 
literal one. This is a sharp contrast to the cyborg of mid-twentieth century military 
science, which was based on an idea of the body as a machine composed of 
various and discrete parts that may be simulated and replaced as required or 
desired. Although this view and the resulting research attempted to blur or erase 
the line between human and machine, the feminist cyborg is a tool user.
1. Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there are differences between 
them. Cyt)erspace' is a term originally found in Gitxson's /Veuroma/Tcer (1984) and is used 
to describe a world of disembodiment produced by the interface of humans and 
communications technology, wtiat Gibson calls jacking in'. It is also used to describe the 
"virtual space' created through interactions and by design cm the Internet. The Intemet was 
developed by the American military as a means of enabling rapid communication across 
distance, as well as attempting to decentralize control structures, arxi does not include 
sensory stimulation. It is now widely available to audiences tieyond the military. VR (virtual 
reality) may be understood to dMcribe a world wtiere technology enables sensory 
communication via stimulation technologies attached to the body, across di^ance (see 
Schroeder, 1994). Gibson's c^tierspace includes sensory stimulation for those jacked in'. 
That is, the body at the console experiences phenomena in cytierspace as though the txxty 
was immediately physically proximate to those phenomena. These three terms, following 
laoth academic literature and cyberpunk, will here also be used interchangeably.
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Technology is used as an implement to get on with a given task or tasks and is 
not considered to be a replacement for human functioning. This argument, 
however, lapses into the debate surrounding prosthetics since some maintain 
that the use of any tool renders one a cyborg. Although this is not the viewpoint 
taken here, it is important to keep in mind due to the various definitions of 
cyt)org' that are employed in the areas examined here. Feminist cyborgology 
takes the approach that technology is a partner of sorts, to be worked with rather 
than replaced by. This could be considered to be a step back from the military 
scientific cyborg, which works to integrate the machinic into the human, even if 
at the expense of organic parts of the human body.
The post-World War II military-scientific cyborg was hardware-based.
Contemporary feminist discourse takes as its cyborg both the operators of
machines that access cyberspace (Tomas, 1995a:38-39) and the cyborg that
results from embracing and manipulating the confusion of contemporary woman's
social reality for one's own purposes (Haraway, 1985). This idea of the cyborg
is not universally accepted:
However satisfying such an imaginary blend might be, the actual 
status of the cyborg is murky as to whether it is a metaphor, a 
dreamlike fantasy, and/or a literal being; and its mode of 
fabrication and maintenance is, practically at least, problematic. 
(Morse, 1994:157-158)
It is, perhaps, inappropriate to limit the uses and functions of the cyborg in these
discourses to only two since "the cyborg is text, machine, body, and metaphor -
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all theorized and engaged in practice in terms of communications” (Haraway,
1991a:212). Arguably, what distinguishes the feminist cyborg from all others is
that it is fundamentally about multiplicity, fluidity, and confusion (Landsberg,
1995). Haraway (1991b) notes that "feminism is about die sciences of the
multiple subject with (at least) double vision” (195;see also van Loon, 1996). Its
purposes are similarly multiple, but all point toward the creation of a new social
reality for women and, by extension, for everyone.
This plurality is a key feature of cytiorg identity for feminism:
Harawa/s notion of the cyborg foregrounds the ambiguous 
constitution of the body and subjectivity - predicated on the blurred 
boundaries between organism and machine, the individual and the 
technological, the fictive and the real. (Balsamo, 2000:153)
Where the existing patriarchal system depends on the maintenance of binary
oppositions, the blurring of these boundaries is what makes the cyborg so useful
for feminist purposes (Lupton, 1995:101). Plant (2000) explains that
there is no authentic or essential woman up ahead, no self to be 
reclaimed from some long lost past, nor even a potential 
subjectivity to be constructed in the present day. Nor is there only 
an absence or lack. Instead there is a virtual reality, an emergent 
process for which identity is not the goal but the enemy, precisely 
what has kept at bay the matrix of potentialities from which women 
have always downloaded their roles. (335)
Plant (1995) also points out that a distinguishing feature of cyberfeminism is that
it does not, as many of its predecessors did, "seek out for woman a subjectivity,
an identity or even a sexuality of her own: there is no subject position and no
identity on the other side of the screens” (63). It may be argued that this also
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applies to socialist feminism in its inherent multiplicity and 
absorption/incorporation of new technologies. Indeed, Harawa/s appropriation 
of the term "cyborg" is demonstrative of this fact given that the word itself, as well 
as the concept it represents, has origins in the highly patriarchal institution of 
military science (Haraway, 1985:68; see also Springer, 2000).
This new social reality is, in part, the result of increased interaction with 
technologies of various kinds (Markussen, 1995), whether via appropriation of 
existing technologies or adoption of new technologies. Baudrillard, drawing on 
McLuhan, notes that the particular arrangement of signifying objects and images 
affects the way in which the individual sees the world, and that with each major 
transformation from one world-view to the next there is a sense of disorientation 
and discomfort with respect to the loss of the previous world-view (Clark, 
1995:114). This new way of viewing the world includes a transformation of 
gender identity and traditional relationships (Edwards, 1995:84). Tomas (1995a) 
argues that although traditional systems of difference such as race and gender 
still exist, it is entirely possible that these may one day be eclipsed by 
technological differences. If this were to be the case, if one potentially 
hierarchical and oppressive system of difference replaces a system that is known 
to be so^  Gray's (2002) caveats regarding cyborg society would be proven true: 
"Our cytx)rg society is not the reinvention of everything from politics to poetics; 
it is the transcription of old problems onto new forms" (188).
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The very idea of the cyborg, either as metaphor or materially realized 
entity, depends on the abolition, or at least blurring, of binary oppositions, 
especially those of organic/natural and technological/cultural (Balsamo, 1995; 
Springer, 1991).^ The polarity of gender (female - male) is another such binary 
opposition, and so is also vulnerable to the same reconstruction processes that 
work on challenging the organic - technological opposition (Balsamo, 1995:216). 
What makes this binary more challenging to blur and/or eradicate is that gender 
is a naturalized marker of human identity (Balsamo, 1995:217). So, where one's 
body may incorporate a pacemaker or prosthetic limb, the individual is generally 
still called human. The polarity of organic and technological is actually a 
spectrum that allows room for various combinations of the two. The same does 
not apply in the case of the gender binary: a body must be either female or 
male....at least in physical, embodied space. The cyborg is a fitting figure for the 
feminist project since women and cyborgs are both culturally produced and 
reproduced (Balsamo, 2000).
Harawa/s 'Manifesto'
This chapter is concemed with examining the cyborg in socialist feminism.
2. Haraway (1985:68-71) acknowledges three boundary (binary) breakdowns that make 
possible the analysis found in the Manifesto'. They are: human/animal; organism/machine; 
physical/non-physical.
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after Harawa/s (1985) "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and 
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s", and cyberfeminism, especially where the uses 
of technology constitute new grounds for opposition and resistance. It will 
discuss the impact of Harawa/s (1985) "Manifesto", as well as some of the more 
current cyberfeminist literature. Issues of embodiment, subjectivity and 
resistance will tie into a examination of feminist uses of VR as a means of 
framing a new social reality.
Published originally in SocraZ/sZ Revfew in 1985, Donna Haraway's "A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs" began what would become an enduring theme in socialist 
feminism. According to Edwards (1995), "this discourse is primarily concemed 
with the psychological and cultural changes in self-imagination brought on by the 
analogy between computers and minds" (74). The cyborg as Haraway depicts 
it is generally considered a product of late-capitalism with an oppositional 
agenda (Tomas, 1995a; Sandoval, 1995). Haraway (1985) calls the cyborg a 
creature in a post-gender world (see also Tomas, 1995a; Springer, 1991).^ It 
certainly embodies boundary anxiety: "Indeed, as an oppositional cyborg's 
multiple articulations suggested, and as Clynes had already suggested in 1965, 
this most recent of reconceptualizations in the domain of automata was 
symptomatic of the body's uncertain future in the mid to late twentieth century" 
(Tomas, 1995a:37).
3.The cyborg as a post-gender construction win be examined in the next chapter through the 
examples provided by popular culture.
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Haraway (1985:66) claims the figure of the cyborg as representative of 
women's changing experiences in the late twentieth century. This hybrid figure 
brings together imagination and material reality, the combination of which makes 
possible historical transformation (Haraway, 1985:66). The condition of being 
a cyborg is universal; everyone is a cyborg. The key issue becomes what to do 
with this identity. Wilson (1995) notes that "the solution to the condition of being 
a (discursive) cyborg is not to tum your back upon technology, but rather to 
understand it well enough to use it for your own constructive purposes" (244). 
Unfortunately, as Haraway (1985; see also Wise, 1997) acknowledges, 
technology may be a double-edged sword for the feminist cause: although it has 
potentially liberatory applications, the feminization of many areas of work in 
information technology creates new opportunities for exploitation and oppression 
(see also Quinby,1997). Wise (1997) makes the point that 'home work' or the 
Techno-cottage' industry may serve to put women back in the home, and thus, 
seemingly emancipatory technologies may tum into a form of entrapment. A 
useful way to go about utilizing Haraway's Manifesto' (1985), suggests Wise 
(1997), is to combine it with feminist work being done on embodied, sexed, 
differentiated and partial subjectivities. Haraway (1985) provides a chart as a 
means to illustrate the informatics of domination', the result of a transition from 
"an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system - from all
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work to all play, a deadly game" (80)/
Haraway (1985) argues for "a politics rooted in claims about fundamental 
changes in the nature of class, race, and gender in an emerging system of world 
order analogous in its novelty and scope to that created by industrial capitalism" 
(79-80). It may become possible, at this point, that Haraway"s Manifesto' (1985) 
could
provide new metaphoric grounds of resistance for the alienated 
white male subject under first world conditions of 
transnationalization, and thus the metaphor 'cyborg' represents 
profound possibilities for the twenty-first century [ An 
oppositional cyborg politics, then, could very well bring the politics 
of the alienated white male subject into alliance with the subaltern 
politics of U.S. third world feminism (Sandoval, 1995:409).
If this were to come to fruition, would it not be proof positive that Haraway s
universal cyborg existence was a reality, drawing as it must upon fragmented
and fluid identities to bring into agreement two seemingly disparate groups?
The question that naturally follows interrogates the methodology of
realizing this potentiality. The combination of hydra-headed identities with
increasingly accessible technology is a good place to start Cyberspace
"provides opportunities to explore the form limits, abilities, and expression of
bodies in ways unavailable in other social contexts" (Green, 1997:59).
4.Haraway"s columns describe this movement The columns begin with representation' and 
'simulation' respectively, a debt to Baudrillard's orders of simulation (1983).
These orders and their place within the larger cytx)rg discourse will 1% discussed in depth in 
Chapter 4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
Chapter Two
Cyt)er- and Socialist Feminism
Feminist-Cyborgs and Cyberspace
Cyberspace has many possibilities, but a good number of these require
a considerable adjustment for the human bodies involved (Schroeder, 1994).
Chris Hables Gray (2002) describes the experience of being part of an academic
meeting in cyberspace:
In what truly must seem a miracle (the immaculate conversation?), 
everyone can talk at once, because your text eventually comes up, 
with everyone else's, on the screen. As you sit there with your 
mind racing and your fingers dancing, the most your body can do 
is squirm. After several hours of this, you want to stand up, wave 
your arms and scream. (132)
Some would argue that this is the case in any meeting that goes on for several
hours, but the embodied experience of being in a room with one's colleagues
offers several distractions (noticing a particularly horrid tie, watching others
fidget, even just looking around) as well as several comforts (there are other
peop/e involved in the discussion, the convention of taking turns speaking
generally applies). Two issues arise out of the use of cyt)erspace for work and
for play. The first questions the role of cyberspace and/or VR in the
(re)production of systems and structures of knowledge and power, and the
second interrogates the embodied experience of this type of interaction, both
with other users and the hardware associated with accessing cyberspace/VR.
In reference to play in cyberspace. Stone (1995) points out that The 
aleatory, rough-and-tumble quality of CSCP (computer-supported cooperative
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play) generated an environment in which ideas are continually shaken up, new 
risks are taken, and new formations emerge" (245). This might also be applied 
to the use of cyberspace for work. In either situation, innovation and extension 
are required and the result is the creation of new formations. Rather than a 
traditional environment, with colleagues sitting in a conference room or with 
friends with a three-dimensional game/environment, in cyberspace, something 
is added (the machine mediator and all the new and special effects/possibilities 
that it makes possible) and something is subtracted (the physical immediacy of 
others). The boundary between work and play is blurred in cyt)erspace. One is 
able to use the same computer for both, may wear her pyjamas to board 
meetings (in the absence of a webcam^), and may play Solitaire while writing up 
the day's report It is then not surprising that cyt)erspace provokes deep anxieties 
about boundaries and borders on much larger issues (Edwards, 1995:83).
In writing spedfically about VR technologies. Green (1997) notes that they 
are gendered in the same ways that the institutions which produce them are (see 
also Quinby,1997). Because of this, VR itself does not constitute a decisive 
break with present modes of being, but rather maintains many of the ideologies 
which support the present social formations of late capitalism (Cooper, 1997;
5.A webcam is a digital camera used to provide live pictures to an lntemet/byt)erspace 
environment. It operates as time-lapse still photography rather than as a continual streaming 
feed as in video cameras. The iength of time between frames may t>e greatly varied, with 
results ranging from an approximation of 'real-time' action to a new frame every quarbr or 
half an hour or more.
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Squires, 2000).
Prosthetics and Patriarchy
Gray (2002) points out that most figures in the development of machine
integration (doctor-inventors, corporate leaders, govemmental bureaucrats) are
men. Thus, there is "no surprise for ^minists in fact that when phallocentric
culture produces women in virtual space, it produces exactly the same models'
as it produces in other representations and simulacra" (Wise, 1997:185). Plant
(1995) argues that women themselves are simulations, imitations of "anything
valued by man", and so embody the very possibility of mimesis. In being able to
"fit any bill she is already more than what she imitates" (59). This is what
makes her threatening.
The matrix weaves itself in a future which has no place for 
historical man: he was its tool, and his agency was always itself a 
figment of its loop. At the peak of his triumph, the culmination of 
his machinic erections, man confronts the system he built for his 
own protection and finds it female and dangerous. (Plant, 1995:62)
Technologies which enable the human to go beyond the boundaries of 
their organic physicality and immediate sensory experience are examined by 
social and feminist theorists as masculinist and presupposing a masculinist form 
(Green, 1997). Two elements here at play may account for this viewpoint First, 
the assumption of masculinist form is especially appropriate if the discussion
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hearkens back to (post-) World War II military-scientific efforts to integrate man 
with his weapons of war and to better equip him' for prolonged space travel (see 
Ch.1). Second, the idea of bodily integrity and/or 'improvement', if considered 
a particularly masculine notion especially as related to labour, is fundamentally 
opposed to socialist feminist and cyberfeminist conceptions of the utilization of 
technology as a means of altering a political system which places women in the 
category of goods' (Plant, 1995), and thus outside the 'real' political arena. 
Representations of literal cyborgs, that is, an organic body modified/enhanced 
through (generally) visible technological modification, are gendered, female 
cyborg bodies being more penetrable, and thus vulnerable, than male cyborg 
bodies.^  Balsamo (1995) points out that The technological fragmentation of the 
body functions in a similar way to its medical fragmentation: body parts are 
objectified and invested with cultural significance'' (234). The entire gendered 
body functions along the same lines: women are stereotypically considered soft' 
as opposed to the 'hardness' of men (see Foster,2000).
In what may be considered a particularly masculine point of view in the 
context of the current discussion, Wilson (1995) notes that "a machine both 
sheds parts and acquires new ones easily. The human perspective seems to 
insist upon organic integrity as the only possible norm" (246). Sobchack (1995)
G.The anxiety surrounding the permealXlity of the human txxty will tie discussed through 
popular representations in the next chapter.
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does not accept that the presence of her prosthetic leg makes her a cyboig/ 
She is still human, but one with a different method of motility. It could be argued 
that, in line with the socialist feminist cyborg, she has integrated/adopted this 
technology for her own purposes. Sobchack (1995) notes the transparency 
associated with prosthetics - it is the body that must incorporate the technology 
rather than the reverse. A feminist cyborg may capitalize on the perceived 
permeability of the female body as another way to use technology to her 
advantage. On the other hand, because the technologies that may be adopted 
are gendered in the same way as are those who create them, this practice may 
allow increased utilization of technology but toward an end that does not 
challenged the patriarchal practices associated with their production.
A prosthesis is, it should be remembered, an artificial part, one which is
dependent on the body to which it is appended or implanted. It is not
independent of the lived body and is not
an android. An android, existing in the contemporary world only in 
the crude prototypical form of drone-robots, even though deeply 
etched into our cultural mythology, is a self-contained artificial life 
form. A prosthesis is a part, a supplement to a human body, and 
not, however completely integrated, self-contained. (Wilson, 
1995:242-3)
An appended prosthesis is a tool, but because of its visibility it also deeply
7.A prosthesis is "an artificW txxty part that supplements the txxly. but a part that carries an 
operating system different from the body's organic processes." (Wilson, 1995:243) Others 
consider prostheses to be an extension of the human txxty, ranging from a fork to the 
Canadarm. For the purposes of this discussion, ttre former definition applies unless otherwise 
noted.
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troubles the human/machine binary that other potentially cyborg-creating
technologies do not
An appended body part not only recalls the previous, now missing, 
organic part, but actively calls into question the body's integrity. A 
prosthesis, however hopeful and future-yearning, is also 
mnemotechnic. It evokes a consciousness of dis-integration (with 
may be either, or both, historical or fictional). For that reason, a 
hybrid body poses a disturbing dilemma: would you (would 
anyone) choose to have yourself enhanced by the addition of 
prosthetic parts when that process, however it begins, must dis­
integrate your body, dissolving its boundaries, and batter down the 
fortified castle of you identity? (Wilson, 1995:251)
Sobchack (1995) raises the question of the human-ness of prosthetics, noting
that "Without my lived body to live it, the prosthetic exists as part of a body
without organs - a techno-body that has no sympathy for human suffering, cannot
understand human pleasure and, since it has no conception of death, cannot
possibly value life" (213). Given the anxiety surrounding the blurring of the
human/machine boundary, Sobchack's argument can be read to betray a
concern about the am oW  of prosthetic enhancement in a single human body:
if the replacement of an organic part with a non-organic part means a loss of the
human-ness of that part, what happens M/when the body becomes more
prosthetic than organic?
This appears to play into a certain questionable idea of the mind and the 
body as separate and unrelated. Wise (1997) ties the separation of mind and 
body to the phallocentric fantasy of domination in cyberspace:
"The fantasy of reason', like the fantasy of uninvolved sex, relies
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
50
Chapter Two
Cyber- and Socialist Feminism
on the central tenet of the logos - that the mind and body are 
somehow separate entities, which is itself a fantasy. That is, what 
enables the logocentric male subject to fantasize domina^on in 
cyberspace is that he is extending into another fantasy space his 
fantasy, that reason defines him. For feminists considering the 
political and creative implications of VR and other cyt)er- 
technologies this recognition is very useful. In being caught by the 
fantasy that male domination of real space can be extended to 
domination of cyberspace, phallocentric subjectivities are 
problematized. Their presence in cyberspace is a simulation of a 
fantasy that they fail to recognize in their lived ontology, and 
encountering this simulation threatens to undo their subjectivities 
in the real. (182)
Gray (2002) comments that "the cyborg penis is quite the fitting sign for 
postmodern patriarchy: threatened, inconsistent, yet in the end adaptable and 
bolstered by technology, and so still functioning," although perhaps only for the 
time being (105). How long can technological crutches keep patriarchy 
functioning, particularly if feminists are infiltrating the space which patriarchy 
takes to be the latest site of its domination? Plant (1995) goes so far as to 
question the masculinity of the practice of entering cyberspace: "Entering the 
matrix is no assertion of masculinity, but a loss of humanity; to jack into 
cyberspace is not to penetrate, but to be invaded" (60). This invasion or 
penetration is arguably old hat to women, and could provide the edge required 
to stave off patriarchal domination in cyberspace (see van Loon, Î996).
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Cyberspace and Lived Reality^
An important feature of cyberspace is that it allows for new and different 
ways of communicating and interacting, ways which may either be physically 
impossible or taboo in lived reality (Gray, 2002). The development of technology 
offers a means by which the material body may be freed from the confines of 
immediately lived space (Featherstone & Burrows, 1995). Where women are 
concerned, this avenue of opportunity may prove to level the playing field of 
labour: the "new transferable intelligence" of women begins to be valued over 
"the strength or single-mindedness which once gave the masculine its power" 
(Plant,2000:334). In other areas of life, those outside of cyberspace, it is unlikely 
that this will happen in the foreseeable future. If the organic body can be 
perceived as a problem', virtual reality may be able to solve it, "at least 
temporarily, by h/d/ng it" (Morse, 1994:179). What this would entail, however, is 
a near complete fusion between computer/cytierspace accessing device and 
user, since it is, at this point, not possible for cyberspace and lived reality to be 
one in the same.
The relationship between cyberspace and the real world' is a source of 
vibrant debate. Cooper (1997) points out that "the world existing prior to VR
B.'Uved reality" is sometimes abridged into IRL' (In Real Life) in the context of Internet chat 
groups, a term which betrays not only the fantastical perception of cytierspace but also the 
possibilities provided tiy on-line environments.
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cannot simply be seen as a historical constraint to be shed as useless baggage"
(97). The world prior to and outside of VR/cyberspace is one of the major limiting
factors in the realm's potentiality, although some argue that the digital
representation created by the user is outside and opposed to being marked by
the elements that work at marking the physical body (Green, 1997). As has
already been discussed, the idea that "'technology' becomes purely digital, and
can thus be rendered a social and a-cultural" (Green, 1997:61) is false. Both the
technology and those who use it (as well as the virtual identities/bodies they
create) are marked by the 'real' world in which they were created:
the virtual bodies produced through engagements with virtual 
reality technologies are embedded in pre-virtual' material social 
relations and, as such, necessarily incorporate social practices 
which categorize and standardize bodies, and also assume 
relations of difference and inequality between bodies. (Green, 
1997:59; see also pp.66-7)
Squires (2000) notes that "if we are to salvage the image of the cyborg we would
do well to insist that cytierfeminism be seen as a metaphor for addressing the
interrelation between technology and the body, not as a means of using the
former to transcend the latter" (360). The result should be a combination of
bodies and technologies that seeks change in the real world' by beginning in a
space somewhat removed from it, although not completely. Vasseleu (1997)
points but that virtual reality is not an entirely new environment since "the
intelligibility of bodies has always been conditioned by their ability to form
intersections with, and live their reality as, multiple culturally determined spaces"
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(46). Although cyberspace may be the space in which an oppositional politics 
may be formed, to make a significant impact it is necessary to read, what 
happens there back into lived reality (Cooper, 1997; Green, 1997) since The kind 
of protest that has the potential to make fundamental political change is 
embodied" (Gray, 2002:44).
Cyberspace and Resistance
Some think that cyberspace can be used to "undermine both the world­
view and the material reality of two thousand years of patriarchal control"(Plant, 
2000:325). As a relatively new technology, its development has been concurrent 
with similar advances in other areas:
As media, tools and goods mutate, so the women begin to change, 
escaping their isolation and becoming increasingly interlinked. 
Modem feminism is marked by the emergence of networks and 
contacts which need no centralized organization and evade its 
structures of command and control (Plant, 2000:328).
These networks of women and technology represent a change from the highly
organized political framework that may have characterized earlier feminist efforts
to nebulous movement which requires some strategizing, yes, buf one that may
be begun before any articulation or organization arises (Wise, 1997).
What becomes an interesting problem, given the fact that itisa relatively
new environment and far from universal altemate reality, is the magnitude of
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impact that change in cyberspace can have on the world outside of itself. 
Change, IRL', is embodied and unsafe: "T^ ou can totally disrupt the fabhc.of the 
Net without risking your actual body at all. To do the same in the real world is 
impossible" (Gray, 2002:43). This betrays the problem of order in cytierspace 
versus the real world': cyberspace, by its design, functions predictably (Chesher, 
1997). Human involvement is the only unpredictable factor in the equation. In 
the world outside of cyberspace, this unpredictability can become dangerous. 
Thus, negotiating cyberspace can be seen as physically safer" than negotiating 
the world beyond it. Conversely, while cyberspace is allegedly physically safe, 
it lacks the possibility of discovery that is always present in the world outside its 
digitally constructed boundaries: "You can only find what has already been 
found" (Nunes, 1997:167).
The fluidity of the female body has been cited as an advantage for women 
in their creative and resistive uses of cyberspace (Plant, 2000), particularly 
where the potentials of female sexualités "break through or explode the mythos 
and logos of patriarchy" (Wise, 1997:190). Although this is important for the 
feminist project of changing the social reality of women, and by extension 
everyone, fluidity, adaptation, and networking are factors that can be used by 
multiple groups of'others' to achieve the same end; that is, to establish a system 
that, unlike patriarchy, does not rely on domination and oppression. Sandoval 
(1995) explains that those who have been surviving under patriarchy for several
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generations already have the techniques: "colonized peoples of the Americas 
have already developed the cyborg skills required for survival under techno­
human conditions as a requisite for survival under domination over the last three 
hundred years" (408). Cyberspace has the potential to provide a way of 
connecting, of networking, for historical 'others', particularly because of its a- 
spatial construction (Wise, 1997; Springer, 2000). Plant (2000) notes that 
'others' such as women
are admitted on the understanding that they are duty-bound to 
honour and obey the members of the species to which they were 
enslaved: the members, the male ones, the family of man. But 
self-organizing processes proliferate, connections are continually 
made, and complexity becomes increasingly complex. In spite of 
As best intentions, patriarchy is subsumed by the processes which 
served it so well. The goods do get together, eventually. (329)
Through the creation of networks of support and solidarity among groups of
others' (Wise, 1997; Wakeford,2000), feminists may succeed in creating a space
that is free of patriarchal control and domination, even if it is unlikely that, in the
foreseeable future, this space extends beyond virtual reality.
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Introduction
The cultural fascination with cyborgs has a long past. Ancient Greek and
Hindi tales tell of half-human, half-metal creatures (Gray, 2002:4). Gonzalez
(2000) demonstrates that the history of human-machine amalgamations
continued from ancient times to the present. In contemporary culture, the most
prevalent representations of this coupling can be found in cyberpunk fiction, on
television, in movies, and, as Oehlert (2000) notes, in comic books\ The images
presented in these media can be read in two ways: first, as a coupling between
à human body and electronics or machines, and secondly, as the identity of
organisms embedded in a cybernetic information system (Balsamo, 2000), a
definition that is also used in feminist discourse. These representations of the
figure of the cyborg disrupt ideas of "other", but frequently do not succeed in
creating a truly hybrid creature in any concrete way:
Every cyborg image constructs an implicit opposition between 
machine and human; at once repressing similarities and 
highlighting distinctions. This is the science fictional character of 
the cyborg- it is a hybrid, but the specific traits which mark its 
human-ness and machine-ness vary widely. Signs of human-ness 
and, alternatively, signs of machine-ness function not only as 
markers of the "essences' of the dual natures of the hybrid but also 
as signs of the inviolable opposition between human and machine. 
This is to say that cyborgs embody human characteristics that 
reinforce the difference between humans and machines. (Balsamo,
1 .Children’s toys, which tend to be highly gendered in orientation, are also a source of cyborg 
representations (see Schwab, 1987); a recent print advertisement from a major national 
department store offered $10 off the Hot Wheels Octoblast Cyborg City race track.
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2000:149)
The proliferation of representations of the cyborg, then, are not so much about 
attempts to predict what may occur to the human body in the future, but are more 
about expressing the fears and fantasies of contemporary culture that surround 
the increasing presence of technology, particularly where it intersects with the 
human body.
Lupton (1995) notes that, "in an era in which risks to the health and well
being of the fleshy body abound, in which ageing and death are feared, the
cyborg offers an idealized escape route" (101 ). The figure of the cyborg in many
contemporary cultural representations is forced to take on human anxieties about
the short-comings of the human body. This is, however, a difficult projection to
maintain. While the figure is ideally the human body improved through its bond
with technology, what representations of the cyborg frequently succeed in doing
is presenting an image that re/n^rces rather than blurs the boundaries between
human and machine:
[i]n many ways, those created figures might be seen not to dissolve 
the boundaries of human and the technological but to serve as 
clarifying mirrors for the human. The image may appear as a 
distortion of a conceptual ideal but it does provide an instance of 
the very self-division that constitutes Western - subjectivity. 
Particularly in fictional forms, but implicitly, I think, in scientific and 
philosophical arguments, the imaginary technological humanoid 
figures are means of displaying the human encounter with itself. 
(Rayner, 1994:125-6)
Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that mainstream representations of cyborgs do
nothing to challenge the dominant ideological view of human, machine, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
Chapter Three
Cyborgs In Media and Cultural Studies
femininity: "in fact, what look like provocative notions of a human identity, are not; 
they reassert a distinct identity between machine and human in a 'post- 
technological world" (Balsamo, 2000:156). It is this idea which is the key theme 
in this chapter, and is the one that most clearly demonstrates, because of its 
contemporary nature, that literal representations of the figure of the cyborg have 
not moved beyond the fragmented approach taken by early military science. The 
representations of the cyborg in various media are, in some ways, tied to the 
feminist cyborg in that they utilize the same definition of a controller operating 
in cyberspace. They are closer to the cyborg of military science, however, in that 
they not only frequently depict the figure as of quasi-miiitary origin, but aiso in 
that they are most frequently men. This can be considered reflective of the 
anxieties surrounding human and machine interfaces, as well as representative 
of the fact that Baudrillard's idea of implosion has not occurred in any literal way.
Upon examining contemporary representations of the figure of the cyborg,
it becomes clear that rather than creating a new being, a true hybrid,
contemporary media succeed only in creating humans with machinic elements
or machines with human characteristics. Oehlert (2000), discussing comic book
cyborgs, salientiy points out that
[a]s opposed to pilots of fighter aircraft who require a great deal of 
their attention to be focussed the operation of their system. 
Cyborgs whose systems are managed intuitively require little of 
their attention to be diverted from the actual combat. The issue of 
humanity with comic book cyborgs then, is not if the machine will 
take over the human side of the equation, but what will the human 
half choose to do with his new abilities? (119)
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This observation may easily be applied to representations of the cyborg in other
media, and is indeed also the case with 'real-life' cyborgs:
As the Twentieth Century approaches the Twenty-First, modern 
technology is making cyborgs of us all. As our sensory, mental, 
and physical powers are being expanded by machines, we are ail 
becoming Six Million Dollar persons. Electronics extend our eyes, 
ears, and voices; processing powers; prosthetic devices, plastic 
aortas, and pacemakers extend our very limbs and lives. (Rollin, 
1979:306)
These modifications of human perception and interaction with their environments 
does not create a new species or group of markedly different beings. Human 
interaction with technology is just that - interaction. Prosthetics and/or artificial 
replacement parts do not fundamentally change the nature of the human; a 
human with a prosthetic arm or a pacemaker is still a human, albeit one with non­
human additions. Full integration of the human and the artificial is not achieved, 
as the artificial part remains separate and distinct from the rest of the human 
body.
This chapter will examine representations of the figure of the cyborg in 
several media. Works to be focussed on include William Gibson's cyberpunk 
novels. Star Trek's 'The Borg', Martin Caidan's Cyborg (1972), which was the 
basis for television's S/x M////on Oo//ar Man (1972) and The Wbman 
(1975), and various filmic representations ranging from 8/ade /?unner(Dir. Ridley 
Scott, 1982) to the Term/na/or(Dir. James Cameron, 1984,1991) and Robocop 
(Dir. Paul Verhoeven, 1987: Dir. Irvin Kershner, 1990; Dir. Fred Dekker, 1992) 
series. So-called 'real life cyborgs' will also be examined. The work of Australian
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performance artist Stelarc will be particularly emphasized, as well as the 
performative aspects of the work of Canadian engineer and seif-styled cyborg 
Steve Mann.
Cyberpunk
Counter-cultural guru Timothy Leary (2000) notes that cyberpunk refers 
to the personalization, and thus popularization, of knowledge and information 
technology. "Innovative thinking on the part of the individual" (534). Cyberpunks 
are not necessarily located exclusively at the high-technology end of the 
spectrum. They are instead "sophisticated adepts along the continuum of 
hardware intersystems that comprise the material expressions of a systematic 
culture of technology" (Tomas, 2000:180). Cyberpunks work well with various 
forms of technology and consider it to be easily fused to any biological system, 
particularly human systems (Dyens, 2001:74). The conjunction of human and 
machine in cyberpunk discourse results in a highly adept tool-using human, 
where technology is the tool and acts as a naturalized extension of the human 
system. The new life fluid of this amalgamation is information, which Tomas 
(2000) terms "a new form of blood in this post-industrial cyborg world" (176).
Cyberpunk as a genre of science fiction is concerned overwhelmingly with 
the dismissal of the body, or 'meat', in favour of the ultimate goal - pure, bodiless 
rnind (McCarron, 1995). "The body, for cyberpunk writers, is an 'accident'.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
Chapter Three
Cyborgs in Media and Cultural Studies
unconnected to the pure substance of mind. They are fascinated by
'enhancement'; throughout their novels the human body becomes less organic
and more artificial, increasingly machine-like" (262). The Cartesian distinction
between body and mind in cyberpunk is a prevalent theme, and is often given
shape in distinctions between, for exampie, the 'console cowboys' and the
Artificial Intelligences such as Wintermute in Gibson's /Veuromancer (1986)^.
The differences between these two also have to do with access to information.
Where the Artificial Intelligences (Als) are frequently corporate-owned
cyberspace watchdogs, the console cowboys work to access the information
monitored by the Ais. Technoiogy, then, can work both for and against a
cyberpunk and/or console cowboy:
For cyberpunks technology is inside the body and the mind itself. 
Yet it is also global: the satellite media net, the multinational 
corporation both recurring as dominant iiterary tropes in 
cybemovels. Cyberpunk is characterized by its integration of these 
technologies with a hedonism and a counter-culture 'guerilla' 
political consciousness, which - in contradistinction to 1960s 
countercuiture that was rural, romanticized and anti-science - takes 
the hacker along with the rocker as its cultural icon. (Squires, 
2000:363)
But, as Leary (2000) notes, politicai activism may not be the only motivation 
behind cyberpunk :^
Cyberpunk is, admittedly, a risky term. Like all linguistic
2. Gibson's work will be discussed further below.
3. Taylor (2001) provides a useful categorization of the various incarnations of the hacker 
since the inception of the computer industry. Although the overlaps between Leary’s use of 
’cyberpunk’ and Taylor’s list of ‘hackers’ is large, the terms do not themselves overlap.
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innovations, it must be used with a tolerant sense of high-tech 
humour. It's a stop-gap, transitional meaning-grenade thrown over 
the language barricades to describe the resourceful, skilful 
individual who accesses and steers knowledge/communication 
technology towards his/her own private goals. For personal 
pleasure, profit, principle, or growth. (534-5)
It is here that perhaps the most sizeable gap between cyberpunk and fictional
console cowboy is to be found: console cowboys engage in cyberpunk kinds of
activities because it is a matter of survival rather than principle. But, it should
also be noted, both cyberpunk and console cowboy operate subversively,
frequently with pirated technology (Dyens, 2001). Leary (2000) explains the
cyberpunk toolkit, noting that cyberpunks are
fascinated by navigational information - especially maps, charts, 
labels, guides, manuals, which help pilot one through life. [The 
cyberpunk] continuously searches fortheorles, models, paradigms, 
metaphors, images, icons, which help chart and define the realities 
which we inhabit. (538)
This fairly utopian vision of cyberpunk is not shared by all. McCarron (1995)
argues that
despite cyberpunk's reliance on and fascination with technology, 
the genre is deeply consen/ative and anti-technology, implacably 
hostile to any further erosion between the human and the 
mechanical. In the 'face' of increasing mechanization, cyberpunk's 
Cartesian privileging of mind allows its readers to reassert their 
supremacy over the machine. (271 -2)
Within William Gibson's cyberpunk novels, McCarron's argument would appear
to be valid, as I will now show.
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Gibson's A/euromancer and Counf Zero
David Tomas (2000) notes that "Gibson's novels and short stories are
influential examples of 'cyberpunk' literature, a genre of science fiction literature
that deals with first-generation cyborg or machine/human symbiotic activity in an
immanent post-industrial information-governed universe." (175) 'First generation'
implies that, perhaps, the interface has not been perfected, that there are still
gaps between human and machine. This is apparent in Gibson's cyberpunk
novels. A/euromancer (1986) is the story of Case and Molly as they engage in
a somewhat covert data recovery operation for Armitage. At play in the novel is
the juxtaposition of the two main characters. Case and Molly. Case is a 'console
cowboy' who 'jacks in' to cyberspace to earn his living recovering/stealing data,
and so deals with cyberpsychic or software technology, as opposed to Molly's
material technicity as a 'razorgirl' whose body and reflexes have been altered to
create a combat/security machine. Both rely on technological edge to be
successful in their fields. According to Tomas (2000),
Technological edge can be defined as the product of a successful 
conjunction of advanced technological hardware and contextually 
sophisticated techniques. This conjunction produces a 
technoscape that is also common to the functional architecture of 
the technophilic body functions - the structure and capacity of the 
human memory, the range and sensitivity of the senses, the 
relative questions of organically constrained speed and power. 
(179)
This idea meshes with Clark's (1995) breakdown of the two basic models of the
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cybernetic body present in Gibson's work. The first is a disembodied but 
perceiving consciousness that is operative in cyberspace, what could also be 
considered a metaphoric cyborg. The second is a hardwired 'immersion' in 
virtual space. What Clark's schema lacks is an account of the myriad versions 
of the altered body present in Gibson's cyberpunk.
It is for this reason that the three categories of comic book cyborgs 
outlined by Oehlert (2000) are more appropriate. His first category is that of the 
simple controller, which encompasses informational interfaces, vaccinations, and 
technical manipulation of genetic information. The second is that of the biotech 
integrator. This category includes such things as prostheses and 
human/machine weapons systems. Finally, the category of the genetic cyborg 
includes direct machine-human connexions and the downloading of human 
consciousness. Each of Oehlert's categories are represented in A/euromancer. 
Case is the simple controller, Molly the biotech integrator, and Case's aid, the 
Dixie Flatline, as a downloaded and formerly human consciousness fits into the 
third category of genetic cyborg. What is important to acknowledge about these 
three categories is that the first two categories appear to be currently existing and 
as such are, again, based on human bodies interacting with or- modified by 
technology. Molly's body is structurally modified with an enhanced nervous 
system to allow faster deployment of the Ten double-edged, four-centimeter 
scalpel blades" that are housed beneath her fingernails (Gibson, 1986:25). She 
is still human, her tools are simply more readily accessible. Case must use
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external technology to access cyberspace, making him little different than 
contemporary Internet users who must type and click to access their information. 
The third category, however, is completely fictional. As has already been 
discussed, embodiment is a key element for human-machine interaction. 
Without the body, the technology cannot make this kind of connexion.
Tomas' (2000) notion of the technophilic body plays upon this idea of 
embodiment:
A fec/rnopMc body is the product of various degrees of aesthetic 
and functional transformations directed to the human body's 
surface and functional organic structure. Such transformations can 
be divided into two distinct categories. The first category is 
composed of techniques and technologies that are used for various 
aestbef/c manipulations of the body surface. These include 
cosmetically redesigned faces, muscle grafts and animal and/or 
human transplants that effectively blur visual cues for gender and 
human/non-human differentiation. The second category is directed 
to fundamental Avncf/ona/alterations to the human body's organic 
architecture. It includes biochip implants, prosthetic additions 
mediated by myoelectric coupling, and redesigned upgraded 
senses. (176)
What is peculiar about Gibson's work, however, is that the degree of human- 
machine integration plays a less prevalent role than the issues of "pure mind' and 
downloaded consciousness/Artificial Intelligence. The attention paid to the 
apparently masculine activity of 'jacking in' for work and 4he Artificial 
Intelligences  ^ that populate cyberspace exceeds by a substantial margin the
4. Gibson’s Artificial Intelligences are acutally neither male nor female, but appear in human 
form when they need to communicate with humans. They most frequently in Gibson’s novels 
appear in male form, such as the Finn or Neuromancer.
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attention paid to those interfaces that involve contiguity between the body and 
technology. Case may choose to 'jack ouf, but Molly is always, in her way, 
'jacked in'.
Martin Caiden's Cybo/g (1972) tells a related story, one that chronicles the 
story of Steve Austin, a military test pilot. After a horrible crash, he is left 
severely disabled. The military powers-that-be decide to turn him into an 
experiment in building the ultimate human by enhancing him with technology. 
This is the novel upon which television's Sôr M////on Oo//ar Man was based. It is 
interesting to note that although the majority of the novel focuses on Austin's 
crash, rebuilding and rehabilitation, this is dealt with only in the theme song of the 
television show: "Steve Austin, astronaut, a man barely alive. Gentlemen, we can 
rebuild him. We have the technology. We have the capability to make the world's 
first bionic man. Steve Austin will be that man. Better than he was before; better, 
stronger, faster." As a bionic man, Austin's 'enhancements' are permanent in the 
same way that Molly's are permanent; both have built-in, non-removable 
prosthetic tools that allow them to perform their jobs with technological edge.
The main assumption in Gibson's cyberpunk is that boundaries between 
subjects, their bodies, and the outside world are being reconfigured, that is, that 
the binaries are beginning to blur (Featherstone & Burrows, 1995:3). This idea 
provides the background for the cyberpunk belief that "existence is a territory 
where biology, technology, and culture fuse into one another" (Dyens, 2001:73). 
It is, however, a fantastic vision. If it can be assumed that the three were
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separate in a pre-cyberpunk reality, they certainly remain so now. Each may,
indeed does, impact upon the others, but there is a perceptible difference
between them, and the points of intersection do not always convey a positive
vision in Gibson's work:
His works prefigure a culture where the organic architecture 
sustaining the human sensorium has undergone various degrees 
of collective biotechnological prosthetic transformation. From the 
point of view of the cultural complexity of their technological and 
ecological vision, the best of Gibson's works are therefore 
positioned at the imaginative threshold of potential post-industrial 
techno-dystopian cultures. (Tomas, 2000:175)
But perhaps these techno-dystopian cultures' are not that imaginative. Perhaps
they are more contemporary than future-looking. Featherstone (1999) points out
that
the ways in which science fiction influences business and research 
practices, as in the case of William Gibson's (1986) influential 
descriptions of cyberspace, is a further process of extending the 
horizon of expectations of human-machine fusions. Such 
processes directly and indirectly help to modify our everyday 
common-sense understanding of how bodies work. (2)
From a contemporary point of view, it is true today that biology, technology and
culture are separate, if they were not, they could not be said to impact upon or
influence one another for they would be one in the same, an implosive
phenomenon.
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Cyborgs on Film
Cyborg films, particularly B/ac/e Bumec Robocop, and the Tierm/nafor
series, present problems with human-machine fusion. 6/ade Burner most
specifically presents a moral conflict in which humans are seen to be "good" and
machines are seen to be 'bad' (Featherstone & Burrows, 1995). Pyle (2000)
notes that there are implications for understandings of the nature of being human
in the creation of filmic cyborgs:
B/ade Banner and the Term/nafor series not only reflect upon the 
threats to humanity posed by unchecked technological 
development, they raise even more probing questions about the 
consequences of our definitions of the human. These films 
demonstrate that when we make cyborgs - at least when we make 
them in movies - we make and, on occasion, unmake our 
conceptions of ourselves. (124-5)
Cyborg films present images of the figure that range from purely machine-based
military models to genetically tailored human simulations (Tomas, 2000).
Examples range from Schwarzenegger's Terminator to the replicants in B/ade
Bunner. Term/nafor 2 provides an interesting example of what is not technically
a cyborg, one which fits into the human simulation end of the filmic cyborg
spectrum. The T-1000 (Robert Patrie), being made of a molten metal closely
resembling mercury, is not a cyborg. It is instead a shape-shifter capable of
taking the form of anything it touches, with the exceptions of machines with
moving parts and objects that do not have the same volume as itself (Term/nafor
2, Dir. James Cameron). Dyens (2001) points out that
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this film marks a turning point in our understanding of 
representation. Here, for the first time in the history of cinema, the 
distinction between reality (the 'normal' images of the film) and 
culture (the film's special effects) no longer applies. A reai cyborg 
materializes in Term/nafo/'g, a 'thing' whose essence is perfectly 
half-human and half-technological (since even minute examination 
of the film negatives upon which physical reality is imprinted, does 
not aliow us to distinguish between actor and cyborg). Term/nafor 
2 tears the body away from its signifiera, plasticizing it, melting it 
down, and then resolidifying it later. (84)
Although this shift is the product of digitai imaging technology, the second
Terminator, as an inaccurate cyborg, neatiy sidesteps the anxiety created by
other cyborgs on film. Because it starts from a point other than that of the
human, viewers may be frightened by the shape-shifting abilities that abet its
violence. What Is interesting to note is that there is a progression in the
Term/naforfilms from the mechanical cyborg being demonized in the first film to
the completely synthesised Terminator being placed in the role of the 'bad guy'
in the second film. This may reflect an increasing acceptance of human-machine
fusion in Western culture, but more likely indicates the film maker's push for the
fantastic in his villains. What makes this situation even more interesting,
however, is that the first Terminator was not a cyborg either. The difference in
the creation of anxiety in audiences lies in the form in which the two Terminators
were constructed. It can be inferred that because the first Terminator is
mechanical, it was assembled in human form. The second Terminator, however,
does not have an original physical form, having instead the ability to take on
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shapes as it requires/
Holland (1995) argues that the fears regarding technology in cyborg film
are essentially two-fold - being replaced by and/or becoming machines. This is
revealed in the anxiety that surrounds 6/ade Runner "the film has thus reached
a limit of sorts, a limit that reveals that in B/ade /?unner when humans make
cyborgs, it means the unmasking of the human through an anxious recognition
that both were assembled in the first place" (Pyle, 2000:132). B/ade Bunne/s
replicants are mechanical human simulations, and thus are not cyborgs. The real
anxiety in the film lies in the quality of the simulations. "More human than
human" is the motto of the replicant manufacturer, Tyrell (B/ade Burner, 1982).
This theme is picked up in 7enn/nafor2:
But though the film appears to deepen the distinction between 
human and machine, setting the moral and ethical principles of a 
human education against the threatening autonomy of a mutable 
technology, it achieves this distinction by way of a hybrid 
intermediary that upsets the stability of the opposition. The cyborg 
can learn, and it seems to acquire - to earn - from its contact with 
humans nothing less than genuine human subjectivity. The film's 
overt humanist thematics are thus made tenuous when it is 
revealed that the cyborg terminator is indispensable to the 
opposition: both for the story of the human opposition fo the 
machines and for the conceptual opposition between human and 
machine. In one sense, the cyborg is benevolent only because of 
its complete obedience; at the same time, however, the opposition 
between human and machine is placed at the mercy of the cyborg. 
(134)
The first Tenn/nator juxtaposes human and machine in a similar way: "[Kyle]
5. A third installment of the Terminator series is slated for release in 2003, and will be 
directed by Jonathan Mostow. It is called Terminator 3: Rise of the Machines.
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Reese and the Terminator are twisted mirror images: humans have built 
subjective, intelligent military machines, but are reduced to a militaristic, 
mechanical emotionless subjectivity in order to fend off their own products" 
(Edwards, 1995:83). Sarah Connor, the female lead in both Term/nafor movies, 
is represented in the second film as a warrior but, despite her masculinized body, 
is still susceptible to pain and injury, both physical and emotional/psychological, 
while the hyper-masculine Terminator is not.
Pain in cyborg films is often "invoked as a sure signifier of human-ness" 
(Holland, 1995:162). The machinic in cyborg film is frequently presented in 
mascuiine form (the Terminators, Robocop) while the human is represented by 
the presence of women (Sarah Connor in the Term/nafor series, Murphy's wife 
and partner in Bobocop). The women in cyborg fiims are vulnerable to pain and 
injury where their machinic male counterparts are not. The gender coding 
present in these films depicts males as hyperreal soldiers with little attempt made 
at either exploring or crossing gender boundaries (Featherstone & Burrows, 
1995). It may be that the prevalence of gender coding in cyborg film contributes 
to the anxiety provoked by B/ade Bunner. Here, there are no dominant non­
replicant female characters. Rachel, Tyrell's assistant, is exposed early in the 
film as a replicant and Pris is known to be one before she is visually introduced. 
The conclusion of Ridley Scott's director's cut of the film leaves open the 
possibility that Deckard may also be a replicant but for the majority of the film he 
is assumed to be human. So, where the typicai cyborg film would place women
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in Deckard's position, 8/ade Bunner confuses gender coding in the genre by 
making women into machines. This gender coding extends beyond the 
concepts of pain and vulnerability. Women in cyborg films are frequently placed 
in stereotypical roles: Sarah Connor is in a psychiatric hospital in the second 
Terni/naforfilm, Rachel is a secretary. Pris is a prostitute or 'pleasure unit'. Thus, 
it is apparent that Ih e  cinematic imaging of cyborgs might suggest new visions 
of unstable identity, but often do so by upholding gender stereotypes" (Balsamo, 
2000:156).
The relationship/distinction between mind, body, and 'self also appears
to be contested in cyborg films. A 'genuine' human mind is frequently the
essential element of a human person (Holland, 1995). Within the vast category
of cinematic cyborg characters, there is something of a hierarchy based on the
presence or absence of a 'self: those purely mechanical/technological figures are
contrasted to cyborgs that are more closely 'human' (Holland, 1995). The
presence of a mind is a source of difficulty for Robocop : "among the many
cyborg films, none captures so well what would have to be the cyborg's divided
consciousness, the sense of being an improved artifact and of having been once
a fully human person" (Wilson, 1995:253). The cyborg point-of-view sequences
in Bobocop are a way of displaying this dualism:
The convention of showing the world through the cyborg's eyes 
complete with typed designations and commands, though familiar 
from other films, entrains what becomes an important subtext in 
[Bobocop]: the cyborg has been given a new consciousness, but 
he struggles to regain his old human self-awareness. (Wilson,
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1995:252)
The Temt/nafor films also use cyborg point-of-view sequences, but to different
ends. What is meant by showing the audience what the Terminators see is the
establishment and reinforcement of difference:
The Term/nafor blends a perverse, exaggerated masculine ideal - 
the ultimate unblinking soldier, the body-builderwho treats his body 
as a machine - with Images of computer control and robotic single- 
mindedness, complete with the alien subjective reality provided by 
the Terminatofs-eye sequences. (Edwards, 1995:81)
Cyborg film as a genre, while creating anxiety about machine - human 
relations, does little to represent a true hybrid. Bobocop is probably the closest 
to being a true, Impiosive, cyborg since his human predecessor, Murphy, is 
dependent upon the technologies that have been used to create Robocop for any 
form of survival. What prevents even this union of technology and the human 
from being completely successful is the kind of machine into which Murphy is 
made: he has been given a new consciousness, but it is still a masculine 
consciousness, one that augments the pseudo-military characteristics of 
Murphy's human consciousness and thus makes no attempt at the creation of a 
new kind of being. Springer (1991 ) notes that the discourse in both the scientific 
community and in popular media surrounding the 'fusion' of humans with 
computer technology is often presented in positive terms as a way of escaping 
the "imperfections of the human body" but that this discourse "simultaneously 
uses language and imagery associated with the body and bodily functions to 
represent its vision of human/technoiogical perfection" (303). Even Robocop is
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a human first and a machine second rather than a 'humachine', a form of being 
that is simultaneously both.
The Borg
Fuchs (1995) calls Star Trek; The A/exf Generaf/on's^ The Borg
a neosocialist cyborg "community" which is interconnected through 
bioengineering and other advanced technoiogies, [which] appear 
to be androgynous humanoids. In spite of their individual bodies, 
however, they constitute a single consciousness. Ruthless and 
emotionless (like all who oppose the optimistic imperialism of the 
USS Enfe/pnse), the Borg reproduce themselves by assimilating 
bodies [...] by literal physical penetration. (281; see also Rayner, 
1994)
Clarke (2002) terms the collectivity an "organic artificial life form" that is 
frightening and not tolerated because of its lack of individuality and autonomy 
(48-9). This is typical of recent science fiction's stress on "the dark side, the 
"undecidables and double binds' of cyborgian potential in which modified 
humanoids [...] pose terrifying threats which must be overcome" (Wilson, 
1995:243-4). These are conventional fears surrounding not only issues of 
autonomy and individuality, but also anxieties about technological transgression 
of biological and cultural definitions of the human (Rayner, 1994). The main plot 
line surrounding The Borg centres on the issue of coilective mind, and thus
6. ‘Data’, another character in the series and of similar construction as the Terminator, is also 
sometimes referred to as a cyborg (see Gray, 2002). He is, in fact, a highly advanced
android, and thus will not be discussed in depth here.
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largely neglects the implications of human-machine fusion (Benford & Malartre, 
2002)/
The various Sfar Trekseries tend to represent perfection in technologicai,
intellectual, or social utopias as leading to "cruel, totalitarian, and inhumane
exercises of power" (Rayner, 1994:129). The Borg, as a variation on this theme,
is alarming because it appears to be invincible. This is a direct result of its
method of reproduction, as well as its hyperconformity and lack of individuality:
The Borg accumulates the knowledge of other races before 
annihilating them; it is self-corrective and self-regulating, and thus 
cannot be destroyed by conventional weapons. Its humanoid parts 
are identical to the collective whole and 'single-mindedly' focused 
on its imperative to assimilate everything in its path. That total self­
absorption in its own imperative and computer capacities precludes 
emotions like sympathy, compassion, or fear and recognition for 
the 'otherness' of the other, which also precludes negotiation and 
dialogue, identification, and difference. (Rayner, 1994:128)
Additionally, in the context of the series. The Borg Is cast as a contrast to the
crew of the Enfe/pdse. Where the crew are individuals within a miiitary-style
hierarchy. The Borg is not only a collective, but also has no hierarchy because
there is no leader. The presence of and emphasis on individual units of The
Borg, such as the Borg Queen in Sfar Trek; Rrsf Confacf, Hugh in the Star Trek;
7. Levy (1997) discusses collective intelligence in detail, defining it as “a form of universally 
distributed intelligence, constantly enhanced, coordinated in real time, and resulting in the 
effective mobilization of skills [...] The basis and goal of collective intelligence is the mutual 
recognition and enrichment of individuais" (13), a very Borg-like definition indeed.
8. The Borg Queen may be the closest to Individual that The Borg get. "The Borg Queen
brought order to the multitude of voices within the Borg shared consciousness. She was the 
‘one who was many,’ in that she embodied elements of individuality as well as being the 
central node in a vast group mind." (Okuda & Okuda, 1997:50)
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77?e /Vexf Generaf/on episode 'I, Borg', Picard as Locutus in both Star Tirek; F/rsf 
Contact and Star Trek; The /Vext Gene/at/on episode "The Best of Both Worids, 
Part r, and Seven of Nine in Star Trek Vbyager, serve oniy to draw further 
attention to the distinction between the crews of the various ships and The Borg 
collective, rather than locating sparks of individuality within The Borg/ The 
extreme cohesion of The Borg draws attention to fears surrounding issues of 
power and control: "The Borg is alien because it is fully self-identical. It signals 
the imagined horror of total self-absorption and self-sameness that cannot stand 
outside itself and therefore cannot resist its own power" (Rayner, 1994:138), and 
thus embody fears about "absolute power and prodigious technoiogy" (Rayner, 
1994:129).
The Borg, although individual units are meant to be identical to one 
another, falls prey to the same kinds of gender coding that are apparent in 
representations of cyborgs in other media. The presence of femaie bodies is not 
a surprise given the method of reproduction (absorption of entire species) 
practised by The Borg, but the most prevalent image of a female-bodied Borg 
unit. Seven of Nine, is hyper-feminine.^°
9. Only Borg units that have left the collective are individualized: Picard returns to the 
Enterprise after having been kidnapped by The Borg and assimilated into Locutus; Seven of 
Nine is allowed an individual identity after much of her Borg technology has been removed.
10. The extent to which Seven of Nine is deployed on Star Trek Voyager as a sex symbol 
was made apparent to me when I attempted to locate on the Internet series stills depicting
the transformation from ‘pure’ Borg to Voyager crew member. Several of the images I 
downloaded were, to my surprise, nude/topless photographs of the actress who plays Seven 
of Nine, Jeri Ryan, more than one of which showed Ryan wearing the Borg make-
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Representations of Cyborgs and Gender
Balsamo (2000) argues that female cyborg images do more to challenge
the opposition between human and machine than do male cyborg images
because of the traditional, stereotypical associations of femininity being less
compatible with technoiogy than is masculinity, but, she points out, female
cyborgs still perpetuate gender stereotypes. Springer (2000) elaborates:
Most cybernetic women in cyberpunk, however, fail to give us a 
radically non-human vision of computerized existence. Repressed 
human memories and heightened emotions continue to motivate 
these hardwired women even after they have redesigned 
themselves. Instead of escaping from their human predicaments 
and entering a liberated electronic reaim, they become haunted 
and powerful killers. Computerized minds harden and fortify them 
rather than provide partial and fluid cyborg identities. Actual 
computer characteristics are in fact distorted by their 
characterizations. The physical passivity that human computer 
users adopt is recast as aggressive violence. The miniaturization 
and subtlety are refashioned into bulging muscles that more closely 
resemble the enormous size and force of industrial technology. 
Additionally, gender, instead of disappearing, is often heightened 
after cybernetic transformation, a point that is obvious in the 
Hollywood representations of ultra-male cyborgs like the 
Terminator and Robocop. (344)
Cyborg bodies are unnatural in their crafting; they are hyperbuilt (Balsamo,
2000). Male cyborgs are especially good examples of this, the images doing
nothing to challenge gender binaries or stereotypes, or distinction between
humans and machines: "[...] cyborgs and men are compatible images which
up/prosthetics she wears on the series.
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mutually support cultural associations among masculinity, rationality, technology 
and science" (Balsamo, 2000:150). As Springer (1991) points out, what is 
particularly interesting to note here is the change from men to hyper-male cyborg 
figures in film:
Whereas traditional constructions of masculinity in film often relied 
on external technological props (guns, armoured costumes, 
motorcycles, fast cars, cameras, and so on) to defend against 
disintegration, the cinematic cyborg heralds the fusion of the body 
with the technological prop. (318)
'Fusion' is perhaps not the right word. As has already been discussed, the
interface of humans with their tools is not so much about the literal joining of the
two, but is rather more about the speed and skill with which those tools may be
used.
Regardless of the sex of the represented cyborg, it becomes clear that
gender is more of an issue in the creation of cyborgs than is the attempt at
closing the gap between human and machine (Squires, 2000; Springer, 1991).
Thus, it would appear that although efforts to create a human-machine hybrid
abound, there is little consideration given to creating a hybrid that is based on
/?uman rather than male or female bodies:
While it may be understandable that cyborgs have humanoid 
bodies and even the appearance of human bodies [...] this does 
not in itself fully explain or justify the highly muscled and 
exaggerated gendered nature of the bodies. Rather, the 
cyberbodies are represented in such a highly gendered way to 
counter the threat that cyborgs indicate the loss of human bodies, 
where such a loss implies the loss of gendered distinctions that are 
essential to maintaining the patriarchal order (which is based on 
exploiting difference) [...]. (Holland, 1995:159)
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Representations of female cyborg figures in film and fiction are not of the same 
nature as those of male cyborg figures. Interactions between women and 
technology are often illustrated through the masculinization of the female form - 
the body-building Sarah Connor in Term/nafor 2 on the human end of the 
spectrum and on the machinic end, 8/acfe Bunne/s highly professional Rachel. 
Again, however, it should be noted that neither Rachei nor Sarah are cyborgs. 
Additionally, it is important to examine those films that have been the most 
popular - the cyborg is almost always in masculine form. Action heroines are 
somewhat lacking in contemporary popular cinema, iilustrating that technology 
is stili more associated with the masculine than the feminine. Thus, in cyborg 
films in particular, when (if) the human body ever becomes truly obsolete, "the 
technological things will be gendered and there will still be a patriarchal hierarchy" 
(Springer, 1991:318).
Technology and Bodies in Art
Performance artist Stelarc uses his body in conjunction with technology
to illustrate his point that the body is obsolete^/
OBSOLETE BODY: It is time to question whether a bipedal, 
breathing body with binocuiar vision and a 1400cc brain is an
11. Stelarc “dispassionately” refers to his body as ‘the body’, which Zylinska (2002) points out 
“foregrounds the ‘originary prosthecity’ of self-hood and its situatedness in the network of the 
relations that criss-cross the envelope of the skin” (229).
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adequate biological form. It cannot cope with the quantity, 
complexity, and quality of information it has accumulated; it is 
intimidated by the precision, speed, and power of technology and 
it is biologically ill-equipped to cope with its new extraterrestrial 
environment. The body is neither a very efficient nor a very 
durable structure. It malfunctions often and fatigues quickly; its 
performance is determined by its age. It is susceptible to disease 
and is doomed to a certain and early death. Its survival parameters 
are very slim. It can survive only weeks without food, days without 
water, and minutes without oxygen. The body's LACK OF 
MODULAR DESIGN and its overreactive immunological system 
make it difficult to replace malfunctioning organs. It might be the 
height of technological folly to consider the body obsoiete in form 
and function: yet it might be the highest of human reaiizations. For 
it is only when the body becomes aware of its present position that 
it can map its post-evolutionary strategies. It is no longer a matter 
of perpetuating the human species by REPRODUCTION, but of 
enhancing male/female intercourse by human-machine interface. 
THE BODY IS OBSOLETE. (Stelarc, 1998:117)
Scheer (2002) examines how performance art may be understood as a
"demonstration and testing of a concept involving the active presence of the
artist's body" (82) and notes that in all of Stelarc's work, the body "functions as
an interface between technologies" (83). Tomas (1995b) explains the bodily
transformation that occurs in this kind of art:
As opposed to the active use of the human body, in performance 
art, or its absence in conventional object-based installation art 
forms, performed installations use a human body, but restructure 
its presence in such a way as to reduce it to the status of a mere 
component in an economy of artifacts and environment. The 
human body is transformed, under these circumstances, into an 
unusual entity since its new spatial position, its s/fe spec/Tfc/fy or 
'installed' sense of situated and objectified self, is the direct product 
of this economy. (257)
Although the term 'post-human' is frequently used to describe this stage of bodily
existence, Appleby (2002) suggests that 'trans-human' would be a more
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appropriate term because "while the post-human reifies the human as a fixed 
point that can be passed or overtaken, the trans-human problematizes any notion 
of a universal fixed human subject" (106-107; see also Clarke, 2002). This is a 
useful concept for this discussion since part of the difficulty in ascertaining the 
extent to which the figure of the cyborg may be considered a site of implosive 
indeterminacy is determining what precisely constitutes 'human' to begin with. 
Springer (1991) notes that the interface between humans and computer 
technology impacts greatly upon, but does not destroy, human subjectivity. It 
creates a new identity, but in the same way that the automobile may be said to 
have changed North American identity. It is a new technoiogy, a new tool, with 
which to negotiate a new environment.
In contemporary North America new environments are frequentiy
introduced through technological change. These new environments require a
rethinking of the relationships between human and nature, body and mind,
individual and society, and human to machine (Poster, 2002). It is in this context
that the work of Stelarc as an example of the effort to negotiate a new
technological environment is instructive:
The body's identity as an installed and performed organism is, as 
such, more accurately portrayed through its physical relationship 
to its new conditions and specifications of existence. Indeed, it is 
perhaps most accurately grasped through a system of fec/in/c/fy 
whose pattern of similarities and differences are rooted in the 
technicai specification of the artificial environments that serve as 
its new breeding ground. [...] A performed installation can therefore 
be considered, from the point of view of its systemic powers of 
representational/perpetual transformation, as well as through its
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power to separate body and consciousness, to function as a 
special kind of mimetically integrated fechno/ogy - ultimately, a 
complicated imaging system through which a living human body is 
radically refashioned. (Tomas, 1995b:253)
This separation of body and consciousness is key to Stelarc's performances in
that it troubles what are often taken to be well-established boundaries.^  ^Appleby
(2002) elaborates:
The body is a zone of organized forces rather than a discretely 
bounded entity. Thus the performances do not point towards a 
post-human condition; they open up the possibility of novel 
interactions and new forms of connectivity between bodies and 
their environments, leading one to wonder where the body ends 
and the environment begins. If Stelarc's work has any importance, 
it is tied not to the possibilities of interstellar migration, but rather 
to his problematization of our ideas about bodily limits and our 
definitions of the human. (110)
It is interesting to note, as Dery (2000) does, that issues of power are absent in
Stelarc's schema, which renders the Stelarcian cyborg "powerful but not
empowered" (583). Massumi (2002), in describing one of Stelarc's pieces,
attempts to place his work within a more collective realm that emphasises the
commonalities of the human species:
It is important to note that this kind of performance setup stages 
sensation collectively. After all, human bodies never come in ones. 
A single body evolving is an absurdity. The individual, isolated 
body of the suspensions was a default position of sensation, just 
as the skin is the default container of human intensity. And, just as 
the body has already extended beyond the skin into a mutual 
prosthesis with matter, from its first perception, so, too, is the
12. Clarke (2002) acknowledges that Stelarc’s work, particularly STOMACH SCULPTURE, 
renders transparent the reliance on technology for the construction of both internal and
external self-identity.
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individual body always-already plugged into a collectivity. (120)
There are no references to social and/or economic situatedness of the cyborg, 
which reinforces the idea that the true cyborg is a thing of fiction rather than of 
reality.
Steve Mann as Performance Artist
Stelarc is not the only human who attempts to alter perceptions of the lived 
body's experiences with its environment through the use of technology, although 
he is certainly the only one who explicitly acknowledges that his work is 
performance art. Steve Mann has been making and wearing computers since 
the late 1970s (Mann, 2001 ). He does so, however, under the banner of science 
rather than art. Mann's performance differs from Stelarc's in that Mann's 
prostheses are semi-permanent, although still removable. Mann's WearComp 
(wearable computer) technology serves many of the same functions as Stelarc's 
machinic prostheses; his body is also used as an interface between technologies, 
especially through his EyeTap camera, which is used to broadcast pictures from 
his field of vision to the Internet (Mann, 2001). The performative aspect of 
Mann's work is difficult to overlook, especially when one examines the evolution 
of the technology of the wearable computer from the early 1980s to the present 
(Mann, 2001:5). The technology is always visible and always appears as a
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prosthesis, a mechanical addition, to his body. This is particularly evident in
Mann's (2000) description of the lengths to which he has gone to improve the
functioning of the interface of his body and the technology:
I've tried everything from dyeing my hair with copper and plating it 
with aluminum, so that my whole body would act as a Faraday 
cage when fitted with a conductive hat, to designing special 
clothing with conductive threads. While many of my designs could 
be described as crazy, and many of the solutions were hardly as 
glamourous as an aluminum hairdo, the process of invention has 
led to some very practical embodiments that address the physical 
problems we will face when many of us decide to become cyborgs. 
Which is to say that I no longer receive unexpected jarring shocks, 
and have been able to devise new methods of protecting my brain 
from potentiaily damaging radiation that do not involve hair dyes 
and metal hats. (11-12)
It is interesting to note that in this passage, Mann seems to be not only playing
himself up as the guinea pig for the cyborg life that he claims many of us wiil
adopt, but also attempts to demonstrate that being a cyborg is really not all that
bad-'See? Look at how far we've comel'. By offering himself as the spokesman
of the cyborg life, Mann demonstrates that technology can be intimately
integrated into day to day life as well as implying that the more people adopt
cyborg technologies for themselves, the less performative and spectacle-causing
it will be (see Mann, 2001 especially chapter one).
Some of the uses to which Mann puts his WearComp technology render 
even more transparent the extent to which performance is involved. 'Vicarious 
Soliloquy', as a method of remote lecturing, is perhaps the best example. Mann 
(2001 ) explains how he began giving these kinds of lectures and addresses:
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In recent years, as demands on my time have increased, I have 
developed a new way of delivering speeches. It is a method of 
making 'personal' appearances without actuaily being physically 
present in the auditorium. [...] What I have dubbed the Vicarious 
Soliloquy system arose quite naturally out of delivering lectures. I'd 
typically use a video projector, and plug the projector into a 
computer, which would then have a link to my main Web pages, so 
that giving a presentation was a simple act of showing the 
audience a series of web pages. Since I wear (or, in the more 
existential sense, 'am') an embodiment of my WearComp 
apparatus, one of the Web pages I showed would allow the 
audience to see the world from a cyborg perspective. At this point 
in the lecture, I would broadcast, on the screen facing the 
audience, my real-time view through the WearComp device. [...] 
Having delivered this type of lecture multiple times, I began to 
wonder why I was physicaily present at the conference site, 
particularly when the number of invitations to give talks was 
growing. I came up with the idea that I'd do exactly the same thing 
as before, with one minor difference: Only my connection would be 
there - not my face, my avatar, or any other part of me, just the 
existential aspect of facilitation by which the audience could 
vicariously be me rather than see me. (16-18)
Although the very nature of giving addresses is performative, Mann's method is
unique because it utilizes his prosthetic technology to get around the traditionally
embodied nature of lecture-giving. He may appear to be a disembodied
presence, the Dixie Flatiine of the academic world, to the audience, but has
instead taken video-conferencing to a new level. There is nothing new about
Mann's WearComp system other than its wearability. The same effect couid be
generated by carrying a video camera with a iive feed to the Internet.
Both Stelarc and Mann put their bodies in the middle of a technological 
milieu to illustrate either explicitly or implicitly that, on various levels, the body is 
at once a component, an interface, and, they would say, inadequate without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
86
Chapter Three
Cytx)rgs in Media and Cultural Studies
technological additions to meet the challenges of a contemporary technological 
environment. These views are not at all far from Gibson's cyberpunk as 
embodied by Case and Molly, nor from the television and movie versions of 
cyborgs - all somehow speak of a world in which technology and flesh are 
intimately intertwined by necessity rather than by choice.
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Introduction
Baudrillard's connection to the notion of the cyborg is most evident in his 
idea of implosion, that is, "an effect in which the opposing poles of determination 
vanish according to a nuclear contraction or retraction of the old polar schema 
which has always maintained a minimal distance between a cause and an effect, 
between subject and object (Baudrillard, 1983b:56). Taken to its extreme, 
a physically embodied cyborg is indeed a true hybrid figure, one in which the 
human and machine components of its composition are indistinguishable; the 
poles have been collapsed. Although other Baudrillardean ideas may be found 
lurking in this project - whether it be just beneath the surface of the argument or 
just beyond its reaches - the main theoretical concepts and themes to be utilized 
here include, predominantly, implosion, but also simulation and the 
relationship(s) between humans and their machines.
As the first three chapters of this project have illustrated, there is no 
implosive figure resulting from the literal collapse of human and machine. 
Machines are always, on some level, prostheses of the human. Prostheses can 
be considered the midpoint of the subject-object continuum, the very poles of 
which are, in a particular fashion, a clear difference between the two on one end 
and implosion, or the obliteration, of the two on the other. This is a useful way 
of looking at the movement from one end of the spectrum to the other. A 'pure' 
human, one with no mechanical or machinic additions, can be considered the
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subject and, conversely, the machine the object. A prosthesis, as Sobchack 
(1995) points out, becomes a part of the body to which it is appended, thus giving 
it a quasi-subject status, but if removed it becomes object again. With 
implosion, the polar schema of subject and object is obliterated. In this case, if 
implosion were to occur, there could be no distinction between either subject and 
object or human and machine.
Because this thesis is an examination of the tasks to which the figure of 
the cyborg is put in various discourses (whose definitions of the term are not 
completely identical), each of the definitions employed will be examined through 
a Baudrillardean lens. This chapter will rehearse the ordered presentation of the 
thesis, examining first the military-scientific definition with respect to simulation 
and Telematic Man, then the cyberfeminist version in relation to the use of 
technology and pleasure. The Telematic Man resurfaces in the examination of 
the cultural/media studies use of the term, particularly as it applies to celibate 
machines and the idea of the cyborg as a successor species. In each instance, 
the deviations from the true' hybrid nature of the cyborg will be exposed by 
looking at those of Baudrillard's ideas that most closely examine the kind of 
cyborg used in the discourse. After explaining simulation, this chapter will begin 
with an explanation of implosion as it applies to this project.
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Simulation
Because Baudrillard makes it clear that simulation begins with implosion 
(Baudrillard, 1983b: 57), it is necessary to outline what leads up to this point 
(namely, the orders of simulacra) to gain a clearer understanding of what is 
meant by the latter concept. There are a number of different elements to 
Baudrillard's description of the orders. What will be emphasised here are the 
phases of the image associated with each order, as well as the corresponding 
machinic representations.
Prior to the beginning of the orders of simulacra, the image as well as the 
sign is a reflection of basic reality. Signs are limited in number, not widely 
diffused, and represent an exchange relationship between parties; in short, they 
are motivated rather than arbitrary (Baudrillard, 1983b: 84). It is with the 
Renaissance that the orders begin. Here, in the first order of simulacra, the 
image masks and perverts basic reality. This is iilustrated by the automaton as 
a theatrical counterfeit of the human. This order, the counterfeit, does not 
abolish difference. Rather, it supposes an always detectable rift between reality 
and its imitators (Baudrillard, 1983b:94-95). The second order, that of production, 
"simplifies the problem by the absorption of the appearances, or by the liquidation 
of the real, whichever" (Baudrillard, 1983b:95). Represented by the robot, this 
order masks the absence of basic reality. There is no longer a questioning of 
appearance as occurred with the automaton. Instead, the robot does not try to
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resemble the human, focussing rather on the "common substance of production 
and work" (Baudrillard, 1983b:94). In the current era, the reigning order is that 
of simulation. Here, the image bears no resemblance to a basic reality of any 
kind - it is its own pure simulacrum. Signs here are produced from a model and 
according to a code which determines in advance all combinations and 
modulations. DNA (deoxyribonucieic acid), according to Baudrillard, is the 
prophet of this order (Baudrillard, 1983b: 103). The order of simulation is 
embodied in the automaton, which Baudrillard calls "an interrogation upon nature, 
the mystery of the existence or non-existence of the soul, the dilemma of 
appearance and being" (Baudrillard, 1983b:93). It is at this point, where there is 
no longer any reference to any reality, where signs refer only to one another in 
equivalence, that implosion becomes possible.
Implosion
Baudrillard observes in "Xerox and Infinity" (1988 ) that "Am I man? Am I 
a machine? There is no longer an answer to this anthropological question" (n.p ). 
This is, perhaps, the clearest statement of Baudrillard's opinion that there is no 
longer any distinction between human and machine, that this difference has been 
erased. The process by which this couid be said to come about is that of 
implosion. This idea implies not only that the binarism associated with these two 
concepts has collapsed, but that the flow between them has also been erased -
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there is no longer any distance between human and machine, which makes flow 
of any kind impossible. They are one and the same.
Implosion as a concept requires further explanation. In S/mu/af/on
(1983b), Baudrillard offers several examples of implosion at work, among them
television and DNA. He writes: "In both there is only a nebula indecipherable into
its simple elements, indecipherable as to its truth" (58). At root, what implosion
requires is the negation of difference between one pole and another. This is not
an easily determined process:
In fact, this whole process only makes sense to us in the negative 
form. But nothing separates one pole from the other, the initial 
from the terminal: there is just a sort of contraction into each other, 
a fantastic telescoping, a collapsing of the two traditional poles into
one another: an IMPLOSION-an absorption of the radiating model 
of causality, of the differential mode of determination, with its 
positive and negative electricity - an implosion of meaning. 
(Baudrillard, 1983b:57)
The disappearance of the gap between poles, the calling into question of the
traditional models of causality (true/false, subject/object, means/ends), creates
an undecipherability of the two terms of the equation or opposition.
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, Baudrillard (1983a) employs 
several examples to illustrate the process of implosion including signifier and 
signified, the medium and the message, and the mass and the media. The 
masses function as a vacuum, consuming everything and absorbing rather than 
reflecting it. There are no differences produced by the masses. All efforts to 
represent them or to make them function according to the logic of power fail.
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They want only one thing - spectacle. It is here that the masses absorb the 
media. Because the masses are concerned only with the spectacle, they.treat 
all information and/or attempts to produce meaning as such. They prefer the 
medium over the message. Baudrillard's (1983a) example of terrorism also fits 
in here since everything that has to do with terrorism is reversible (death, the 
media, violence, victory)(115). It is in this reversibility that terrorism succeeds 
most. The 'victim' of a terrorist-related death is irrelevant to the masses - all that 
matters Is the spectacle that It creates. Any meaning that could have been 
attached to this (or any other event) is absorbed by the masses, then neutralized 
and diffused, and finally disappearing without a trace. This is the same way in 
which the implosion o f the media into the masses functions. The media attempt 
to create meaning but are enveloped by the masses as spectacle, the medium 
along with the message. What ultimately results from this is an 
indistinguishability between medium and message, mass and media, and 
signifier and signified. The masses do not function according to a code as such, 
favouring instead fascination, spectacle, and the wholesale absorption of those 
signs presented to them. The poles of signification thus collapse, the masses 
having absorbed and diffused both sign and meaning (Baudrillard, 1983a:36). 
Everything drawn into the vacuum of the masses circulates in a hyperreality 
where the real as referential has been eliminated by its being made a model.
It is here that the human/machine dualism can be examined. 
Contemporary efforts, such as cosmetic surgery, to combat aging and genetics
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can be read as an attempt by humans to become more human than human, that 
is, hyperhuman. The incorporation of machines into the human body as part of 
this effort is, however, doomed to failure not only because of the inevitable 
inclusion of food and waste as processes of the human body, as Morse (1994) 
notes, but also because machines within or appended to the body are not 
human. Their inclusion signals the emergence of something different, neither 
human, hyperhuman, nor machine. But this becomes sticky in the consideration 
of polar indistinguishability. Humans and machines have yet to be absorbed 
within one another to the extent that is present in Baudrillard's examples of 
implosion, not having reached the point of indecipherability out of which the 
cyborg as true hybrid could emerge. The use of prostheses of various kinds 
could be considered a movement toward this point, but one which is occurring 
slowly.
The cyborg, from this standpoint, could provide a counterexample to 
Baudrillard's (1983a) claim that 'smooth' or slow implosion is doomed to failure. 
This claim is made in reference to the transition from implosive systems (such as 
those of 'primitive' societies) to explosive systems (such as those present in 
contemporary Westem civilization). The transition from human and machine to 
cyborg is one that mirrors the implosion currently being experienced by the 
expansion-oriented Western civilization because this expansion has become 
uncontrollable. But the expansion of the human body has not become 
uncontrollable - yet. The violent and catastrophic implosion discussed by
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Baudriliard (1983a) as the only possible kind of implosion in the case of Western 
civilization is not one that can be said to be occurring in the case of the implosion 
of the human and the machine. This one is still slow because it has not yet 
reached universal proportions. It may be true that "implosion is inevitable, and 
every effort to save the principles of reality, of accumulation, of universality, the 
principles of evolution which extol expanding systems, is archaic, regressive, or 
nostalgic" (Baudriliard, 1983a:60), but at present neither the human nor the 
machine have disappeared on a scale that requires nostalgia.
This is related to the idea of the cyborg because the understanding of the 
figure as a seamless amalgamation of human and machine is, in the areas 
examined here, false. There is always a perceptible difference between the two. 
Rather than implosive, many of the uses of the term remain in the first of 
Baudrillard's orders of simulacra, but under a new name. No longer an 
automaton where the image conjured is that of an imitation of the human, but a 
cyborg, where the human has been enveloped into the machinic in an imperfect 
attempt at creating a new creature that is an 'improvement" upon the human but 
still all too human.
Implosion cannot be said to explain or resolve the tensions present in the 
consideration of the cyborg as an embodied, physical creation. If a metaphoric 
cyborg can be said to exist, as in the feminism and various mediatic 
representations, Baudrillard's implosion, as metaphor itself, may be considered 
to be more useful since it accounts for the increasing encroachment of and
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dependence upon technology in the lives of humans. There may indeed be little 
dispute that a metaphoric cyborg can exist and could be considered an example 
of implosion. The application of the theory of implosion fails where the cyborg 
is portrayed as or taken to be a physical and embodied hybrid, as is the case in 
both post-World War Two military science and a great number of contemporary 
representations of the figure in various media. Cyborgs and implosion, although 
overlapping concepts, are not synonymous, which is what this thesis has 
attempted to illustrate.
Early Cybernetics and The Creation of Simulations
Baudriliard notes that both the fantasy and the creation of intelligent 
machines results from either humans’ secret desperation for intelligence or 
because humans have succumbed to the weight of "monstrous and useless 
intelligence" and therefore seek to thrust it onto machines to lighten the load 
(Baudriliard, 1988:n.p.). He writes that "entrusting this intelligence to the 
machines in some ways sets us free from all pretensions towards exhaustive 
knowledge" (Baudriliard, 1988:n.p.). Although Baudriliard may refqr here to the 
creation of artificial intelligence, this can be tied to some of the early cybernetic 
research that attempted to replicate human brain functioning and consciousness. 
Here, early cybernetics researchers, as well as those today, sought to create a 
simulation of the functioning of the human brain, among other bodily functions
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and capacities. But, as is discussed in Chapter One, these attempts at 
simulating human functioning in the form of intelligent machines result irhonly 
partial successes: "Indeed, these intelligent machines are only artificial in the 
weakest sense of the word - decomposing the operations of language, of sex, of 
knowledge and in their most basic elements, of digitalising such operations to 
resynthesise them according to models" (Baudriliard, 1988:n.p.).
Baudriliard further notes that these kinds of machines offer the spectacle 
of thought and that humans, as they manipulate them, "devote themselves more 
to this spectacle of thought than to thought itself" (Baudriliard, 1988:n.p.). This 
phenomenon cannot be considered representative of implosion since the 
implosive is necessarily, as a result of the end of panoptic and perspectival 
space, the abolition of the spectacular (Baudriliard, 1983b:54). Where implosion 
has occurred
[t]he medium itself is no longer identifiable as such, and the 
merging of the medium and the message (McLuhan) is the first 
great formula of this new age. There is no longer any medium in 
the literal sense: it is now intangible, diffuse and diffracted in the 
real and it can no longer even be said that the latter is distorted by 
it. (Baudriliard, 1983b:54)
Humans have not moved beyond the manipulation of machines, intelligent or
otherwise, to a space/time/level/stage where medium and message are
indistinguishable. There remains, particularly in the case of the so-called cyborg,
this distinction, and others: male/female; human/machine; animate/inanimate.
This is perhaps best illustrated by Baudrillard's figure of the Telematic (or
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Virtual) Man/
The Virtual Man, immobile in front of his computer, makes love by 
the screen and gives classes by teleconference. He becomes a 
spastic, probably with a cerebral handicap too. This is the cost of 
becoming effective. Just as we can suggest that glasses or contact 
lenses might one day become the integrated prosthesis of a 
species whose gaze has gone, so we can fear that artificial 
intelligence and its technical aids will become the prosthesis of a 
species whose thought will have disappeared. (Baudriliard, 
1988:n.p.)
The emphasis here on prostheses is not to be taken lightly. "Xerox and Infinity" 
(1988) and S/mu/af/on (1983b) can be played against one another with respect 
to the degree of integration of humans and their machines - machines and 
humans in the form of the cyborg are not implosive since the distinction between 
the two is always present in some degree. Machines are rather the prostheses 
of humans. The idea that the cyborg is somehow a truly hybrid mix of the two is 
pure fantasy, as is made clear in the filmic representations of cyborgs discussed 
in Chapter Three. There is always, at some level, no matter how small, a 
distinction that can be made between human and machine. As long as this is the 
case, the combination of humans and machines known as cyborgs cannot be 
/mp/os/ve /n any concrete sense.
A question that arises from this issue is the extent to which humans desire 
this kind of relationship with their machines. The fear of becoming something 
other than human is an area that requires further examination. It would appear
1.Baudriliard uses ‘man’, in this case, to represent both male and female.
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as though humans would rather become better" in some way and maintain their 
humanness than become something in which human traits are indistinguishable 
from those of their machines. The setting of boundaries and demarcation of 
distinctions between human and machine remains important, if only in the form 
of noting what obstacles still must be overcome in order to create an implosive 
figure such as a cyborg.
Cyberfeminism and Pleasure
Baudriliard claims that it is pleasure that separates humans and machines 
and that machines lack artifice (Baudriliard, 1988:n.p.). I assert that until this gap 
can be overcome, there can be no true cyborg, no implosive figure of this sort. 
Telematic Man's use of the MinitePforthe purposes of sending 'sweet' messages 
(called 'Minitel Rose' in France) is parallelled in the cyberfeminist 'cyborg' ideal 
of women becoming empowered by adopting technology and using it for their 
own purposes. Just as Telematic Man uses the computerized telephone system 
to send love letters, cyberfeminists use the Internet to build networks of 
resistance and challenge - both can be considered uses other than those for
2.The explanation of this term given in “Xerox and Infinity” (Baudriliard, 1988) is “refer[ring] 
to the telephone system that has been established in France on a computer network, and 
made freely available to every home” (n.p.).
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which the respective systems were designed.^ Here again, however, the 
technology used in either case is only an aid, a prosthetic, an extension of human 
capabilities. There is not only a physical distinction between user and machine 
but also a functional distinction; that is, the user manipulates the machine to 
perform functions s/he cannot alone. This is the nature of prosthetics and 
extensions. No matter the extent to which machines may emulate human 
functioning and appearance or to which humans may develop (further) machine 
functioning, as long as there remain elements of the human or the machine that 
cannot be simulated/emulated by the other, the distinction between the two will 
exist.
Pleasure, generally considered to be a trait specific to some organic 
species and especially to humans, is a boundary that machines have not yet 
crossed. They may be programmed to display signs of pleasure, such as a 
smile, but cannot, it is believed, experience the sensation behind the expression. 
This is, perhaps, simply one more isolated human function that machines will 
eventually be able to simulate - early cybernetics research did, after all, simulate 
one function after another. Indeed, B/ade Runner's (1982) Pris has, as a 
'pleasure unit', been constructed to do just that. But, as Taube (1961) notes, 
human functioning must be understood before it can be replicated rather than 
simply represented in fiction. Also, this threshold (pleasure) is one that is key to
3.Taylor (2001) notes that this type of use of technology can be considered a form of 
hacking.
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creating a hybrid of human and machine, one whose composition is not of bits 
and pieces of each but is instead something different even at the molecular 
level, bom of the implosion of the human/machine binary.
The issue of fear again arises in considering bow humans use their 
technologies, particularly when examining the machinic language that is often 
employed by humans to describe themselves. What becomes apparent is that 
the human use of technological language applied to their own functioning not 
only resonates with the fear of lost humanness but also appears to be an attempt 
to invoke machinic metaphors as prophylaxes. By describing oneself or others 
in machine-like terms, the hope of 'improvement' by association with machines 
is combined with a drawing of attention to the fact that one is not a machine. 
Protecting oneself against complete absorption by the machine while taking on 
machinic qualities appears to be a human tactic of ensuring that the implosion 
implied by the use of the word 'cyborg' does not come to pass.
It is, however, within feminist discourse, that examples of metaphoric 
cyborgs can be found. Haraway's (1985) use of the term demonstrates this. If 
Baudrillard's theory of implosion, particularly in his description of the Telematic 
Man, can be considered a metaphor as well, a case can be made for the 
existence of such creatures. Where the application of the theory fails, however, 
is when that other definition of cyborg is employed, that which begins in mid­
twentieth century military science and is continued in fictional, particularly filmic, 
representations of the figure.
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Celibate Machines and Cyborgs on Film
Some species are bred for work and nothing else. Mules, for example, are 
the offspring of horses and donkeys, and are work animals. They cannot 
procreate with one another to produce other donkeys - that is a task left to further 
combinations of horses and donkeys. Similarly, combinations of humans and 
machines cannot, as a unit, breed to produce other combinations of humans and 
machines. It is the human that must first procreate and then allow technology to 
begin working with/in/on the offspring. It could even be argued that the 
combination of humans and machines frequently results in a work relationship of 
some type. This is certainly seen in the films discussed in Chapter Three. The 
Terminator, Robocop, and Steve Austin (the protagonist of Caiden’s (1972) novel 
Cyborg and television’s Six Million Dollar Man) are all products of human flesh 
being combined with technology for the purposes of accomplishing some work- 
related goal that could not be accomplished by an unaided human. If any of 
these characters were to breed with others like them, the result would be far 
removed from the technologically altered versions of themselves. In the case of 
the Term/nafor, the result would be machinic and in the case of Steve Austin, the 
result would be human. Humans who are altered by technology and who choose 
to breed with others who are also technologically altered (say someone with a 
pacemaker with someone else who has an artificial arm) do not produce as their 
offspring similarly technologically altered humans. The issue is first human and
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then may have technology appended to their bodies. Star Trek's 'The Borg' is 
another example of this - all Borg units are born humanoid, assimilated- and 
modified into the collective by the implantation of machinic parts such as a 
"magnifying right eye and neural net programs integrated into their bodily 
systems" (Wilson, 1995:n256). They also exist for a clearly defined work-like 
goal - perfection. As a sexually celibate entity, the Borg does not procreate, it 
assimilates.
This issue of celibacy appears in Baudrillard's "Xerox and Infinity" (1988) 
in the discussion of artificial intelligence as celibate. But Baudriliard also notes 
that the celibacy of artificial intelligence extends to Telematic Man because his 
integration with the machine has become so complete. Telematic Man, who both 
works and plays at the same machine, is like the Borg - celibate and non­
procreating. If this is the case, that someone like Telematic Man, Baudrillard’s 
version of a cyborg, is celibate but not alone, would it not mean by extension that 
Telematic Men are not bom, but are rather created? Here again there is a rift 
between human and machine - not only do the machines not feel pleasure, but 
they also do not breed. Humans do both.
Conclusion - Cyborg as Successor Species
Given the non-procreative nature of Telematic Man as Baudrillard's 
representation of a cyborg, it would seem absurd to claim, as Gray (2002) does.
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that the cyborg is a successor species. The anxiety surrounding the end of the
human appears to have incorporated a half-hopeful idea that some part of
humans will survive in the form of the cyborg (see Hayles, 1995). But even this
notion incorporates some uneasiness:
For some time now there has been a rumor going around that the 
age of the human has given way to the posthuman. Not that 
humans have died out, but that the human as a concept has been 
succeeded by its evolutionary heir. Humans are not the end of the 
line. Beyond them looms the cyborg, a hybrid species created by 
crossing biological organism with cybernetic mechanism. Whereas 
it is possible to think of humans as natural phenomena, coming to 
maturity as a species through natural selection and spontaneous 
genetic mutations, no such illusions are possible with the cyborg. 
From the beginning it is constructed, a technobiological object that 
confounds the dichotomy between natural and unnatural, made 
and bom. (Hayles, 1995:321)
Some question whether the combination of human and machine actually does
result in the preservation of the human side of things. Springer (1991), for
example, notes that "fusion with electronic technology thus represents a
paradoxical desire to preserve human life by destroying it" (322).
What does all this mean in the context of the current discussion? As will 
be examined further in the Conclusion to this project, the differences between 
humans and machines are, at present, too great for the cyborg to be considered 
implosive. Lacking the capacities to both experience pleasure or to procreate, 
machines lag behind humans. Conversely, humans lack many of the capabilities 
possessed by machines. The difference between the two is that a human may 
annex machinic abilities through the use of various technologies, but the reverse
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is only currently possible only in fiction.
What has become evident throughout the examination of the difference 
between implosive figures and those that are currently billed as embodied 
cyborgs is that past and contemporary cyborgs are not implosive at all. They are, 
instead, combinations of humans and their technologies in which it is always 
possible to determine where the human stops and the machine begins. This 
does not mean that some future cyborg figure may not be implosive. Quite the 
contrary, as is evident when Taube (1961) states that "no novelist ever imagined 
anything so fantastic but that he wasn't outdone by a reputable scientist" (18).
For the time being, however, implosion is not a concept that can be used as 
descriptor of embodied cyborgs past and present.
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Introduction - The Beginning of the End
McLuhan (1966) points out that "another way of looking at our situation 
today in the age of cybernation and information machines is to say that from the 
time of the origin of script and wheel, [humans] have been engaged in extending 
their bodies technologically" (100). The technologies discussed in this project are 
also extensions of the human body, but are more closely connected to the body 
than script and wheel. This increasing proximity and contiguity of technology with 
the body appears to have created some worry about what this means for 
definitions of the human. But it has also spawned a new field of study, complete 
with new language and new ideologies put forth by technophilic academics, 
among others. Gray (2002) describes cyborg epistemology as thesis-antithesis- 
synthesis-prosthesis. Zylinska (2002) outlines the definition of 'cyborgology' as 
recognizing "that the 'extensions of man' must be analysed not from a human 
point of view but from a position of inbetweenness, as the very process of 
extending humanity' undermines the inviolability of the boundaries of the human 
self and the non-human, machinic other" (3).
It could be argued that neither of these ideas run counter to what has been 
discussed here. It is 'cyborgization' that begins to make it all sound a bit more 
like science-fiction than a scholarly analysis of the present. According to Gray 
(2002), "cyborgization transcends the human, dissolving old distinctions between 
nature and culture or organic and mechanic" (183). All of this is not to say that
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these works are lacking in any way, only that, at times, their focus is too forward- 
looking and not firmly enough grounded in the present. I owe all of these works 
a great debt - they were, after all, the basis for this thesis. This is a weakness 
in my work as well as of those that I cite: looking too far forward, beyond the 
actual embodiments of human and machines that circulate today. Baudrillard's 
(1983a) claim that implosion is inevitable is one that I can respond to only by 
noting that the primary focus of this thesis is an exploration of the uses or 
representations of the figure of the cyborg both past and present. Implosion may 
well be inevitable but, at least where humans and machines are concerned, it still 
has yet to occur with the violence and catastrophe that accompanies 
Baudrillardean implosion.
The kinds of human-machine unions examined here are not implosive 
because they are, in all cases, individual human bodies with machinic 
appendages (or, conversely, machines with human appendages). Even where 
humans have literally taken the technology into their bodies, as with pacemakers 
and artificial joints, there is always a clear line where the human ends and the 
machine begins. But this is not the image that is conveyed by much of the 
literature surrounding the meeting of the human body and various forms of 
technology. Instead, when the discussion turns to the integration of human and 
machine, the inseparability of the two, one has a sense that it is not only 
metaphor that is being employed, that if I am truly tied to my laptop at some point 
my flesh and the keyboard become one. It is a science fiction view of the real
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situation, that humans are becoming increasingly reliant on their technology and 
that they demand that it function according to their specifications, but it functions 
exclusively on the level of metaphor. Tension still exists where the cyborg is 
considered to be an embodied being.
It should be pointed out that the melding of human and machine that 
appears to be so eagerly anticipated is a possibility that requires further 
advances in not only the technology itself, but also the interface between humans 
and the technologies. But this raises a few questions: what will these 
technologies entail? How can they be created? Are they desirable? Are they 
needed? The idea that artificial intelligence may solve some of these problems 
raises a question of its own: if artificial intelligence becomes a reality, will this 
make the issue of seamless human-machine integration redundant or will 
humans desire technological additions to their bodies regardless? These kinds 
of questions need to be examined, especially given the ever-increasing rate of 
technological change. It would seem that taking a step backwards from the 
current emphasis on future possibilities to the state of contemporary human- 
machine interaction would be a good place to start in attempting to deal with 
these questions.
Recap - The Present and Future of Cyborg Research
This thesis has examined the uses to which the figure of the cyborg is put
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in several discourses. In each of these, the cyborg has been made to represent
the hopes and fears of its human creators. In the work of military scientists, the
cyborg embodied the future of human adaptation to new environments without
having to wait for evolution to take care of humankind's inadequacies. As Kline
and Clynes (1961) note:
In the past, the altering of bodily functions to suit different 
environments was accomplished through evolution. From now on, 
at least in some degree, this can be achieved without alteration of 
heredity by suitable biochemical, physiological, and electronic
modification of man’s existing modus vivendi. (346)
In an era when technology was rapidly extending into everyday life, this view of 
combining human and technology was greeted with open arms. The still very 
external nature of these combinations appears not to have raised many fears of 
this relationship becoming too close, although some, such as Taube (1961), did 
question the order in which scientific work should progress, noting that 
understanding human functioning was a prerequisite of attempting to simulate or 
duplicate it. At the same time that work progressed on outfitting men for space 
travel and exploration, efforts were also made to replicate human functioning. 
Although this did contribute to work on space travel, one of the other results can 
be identified as the early stages of work on and interest in artificial intelligence, 
evidenced by the attention to attempts to simulate human brain functions (such 
as the current work on creating a chip to simulate the functioning of the 
hippocampus).
Artificial intelligence, as noted above, is one of the areas in which further
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study must be done. Of particular interest to me is the military history of the 
project and the applications to which it is put, as well as the surveillance, and 
privacy implications of 'smart' technology, an offshoot of work on artificial 
intelligence. The representations of AI in the popular media also require 
attention, especially when one considers the human form that is usually given to 
such creatures/creations. Why does this occur? Perhaps it is human vanity 
combined with a nurturing feeling towards what they create. That is, because it 
is intelligent and was created by humans, humans must also be intelligent and 
so give the artificial intelligences they create a human form. But perhaps not. 
Further investigation is required to adequately address the issues surrounding the 
creation, use, and representation of artificial intelligence.
In Chapter Two, the cyborg was used in a more metaphoric way to convey 
the possibilities of women embracing technology and using it to form networks 
of resistance and support, as well as providing what can be considered an 
example of the metaphoric cyborg as implosive figure. Haraway (1985) and 
others did acknowledge that the proliferation of technology is, for women, a 
double edged sword, one that can both help them and harm them, particularly 
through the creation of the technocottage industry which can re-place women in 
the home while they sell their labour to outside interests. The use of technology 
for purposes other than those for which it was intended is a major point around 
which the hacker literature circulates. An examination of the potential alternate 
uses of virtual reality technology would be interesting and useful to illuminate the
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ways in which hacking and cyberfeminism may both evolve.
The cyberfeminist literature also speaks a great deal to issueg of 
embodiment and technology. It is perhaps here that the strain between bodies 
and technologies is most apparent, not only for the purposes of resistance, but 
also for the day to day lived experience of becoming technologically altered. 
What are the practical issues involved in being a cyborg? (see Morse, 1994 for 
a discussion of alimentary processes in the cyborg). How do these differ from 
traditional ideas of what it means to be human? Are there sex and/or gender 
distinctions present in cyborgs that are not present in humans? It may be from 
the feminist literature that the most productive and accurate answers to questions 
like this will come.
Representations of cyborgs in the popular media overlap with both military 
science and feminist work, and should be examined more closely. Currently, 
cyborgs are frequently depicted as hypermasculine figures with close ties to 
violence of some kind. Female cyborgs of the same ilk are few and far between. 
Androids and robots are more frequently found in both male and female form - 
the replicants in B/ade Runner and Commander Data, his brother Lor and 
daughter" Lai in the Star Trek series, for example. There is, in fact, a continuum 
present in these representations with human on one end and machine on the 
other. In between fall the various definitions of cyborg that have been employed 
in various discourses. Sorting out the extent to which cyborgs exist at all would 
be useful for future work in this field, given the extreme vagueness and confusion
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that the term appears to convey and that this thesis has attempted to expose as 
problematic. Again, the human form given to androids and robots as well as to 
artificial intelligences requires examination. Why are things created to work given 
a human form even when it is not required?
Although a discussion of the similarities and differences between 
McLuhan's and Baudrillard's ideas of implosion already exists (see Genosko, 
1999), a discussion of the distinctions between the two with specific reference to 
the impacts they have on human/technology relationships would be useful. 
Indeed, this thesis could be revisited and reconceptualized by dealing with 
McLuhan's implosion rather than that of Baudriliard, and by slightly modifying the 
definitions of human, technology, and cyborg employed. Where Baudriliard sees 
implosion as a necessarily violent and catastrophic event, McLuhan’s conception 
may be no less violent, but it paves the way for "the intimacy of the Global 
Village" (Genosko, 1999:94). The human and the technological are the explicit 
focus of McLuhan's version of implosion, which makes it a valuable avenue for 
further work.
As a final idea for future research, I would like to suggest an examination 
of the extent to which the literal amalgamation of human and machine is feared, 
desired, and/or needed. The fonward-looking work of many of the authors cited 
here provides ample opportunity to make a closer examination of both the fear 
and the desire encountered in the academic literature and popular Westem 
representations of the cyborg. To what extent would the seamless joining of
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human and machine serve a useful purpose? Some of the same issues raised 
in this work would be encountered in work of that nature as well, such as, what 
makes one a cyborg? But perhaps if these kinds of questions can be dealt with 
in stages and from a particular point of view, a clearer picture of the nature of 
actual interactions between humans and machines would be possible.
Where Are We?
This thesis had as one of its goals the illustration of what some of the 
weaknesses are in the discussion of the figure of the cyborg. Where does that 
leave us? I would hope in a position to begin asking questions about the history 
and future of the figure of the cyborg. Investigations into the present are also 
required, and will inform discussions of both past and future. Above all, what is 
necessary to untangle the mess surrounding intersections of the human body 
and technology is a broad approach to the problem, one that has no home 
discipline and that thrives in the interstices. The cyborg is itself a figure that 
attempts to divest itself of boundaries and borders and as such demands an 
approach that can follow it through its various incarnations.
It is also hoped that further applications of theoretical concepts to the 
figure wilf be fruitful, and will not only help to explain the cyborg, but will also 
illustrate the use of abstract concepts in attempting to understand concrete 
phenomena, particularly where there are both metaphoric and literal uses and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
Conclusion
meanings of the same term. The use of Baudrillard's idea of implosion here was 
meant to point out the fallacy of the idea that the cyborg is the result of the 
obliteration of a clear distinction between human and machine, despite its closer 
fit with the idea of a metaphoric cyborg. It was also meant to demonstrate that 
the application of theoretical concepts is useful in the endeavour of cross- 
disciplinary study.
The Future of the Human
Rickover (1966) states that "technology is nothing but tools, techniques, 
procedures - the artifacts fashioned by modem industrial man to increase his
powers of mind and body” (110). This has been carried over to the present, when
Bell (2000) notes that:
The question of human-machine interface has occupied a central 
place in discussions of cyberspace, especially in relation to its 
effects on our experiences of embodiment and subjectivity. Are we 
now so inseparable from our computers that we have effectively 
become them? Are they us? Are the extensions of our identities - 
prostheses? Do we blend with them, each incorporating the other, 
to become hybrid cybernetic organisms - cyborgs? (4)
While this is clearly not the case, some, such as Stelarc (1998), go even further
in positing that a hybrid of human and machine may not be the final step:
Cyborg bodies are not simply wired and extended but also 
enhanced with implanted components. Invading technology 
eliminates skin as a significant site, an adequate interface or barrier 
between public space and physiological tracts. The significance of 
the cyber may well reside in the act of the body shedding its skin. 
(116)
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Others are not so enthusiastic about the possibility of the eradication of the
human altogether. Gray (2002) points out that:
Cyborgs are often grotesque, illegitimate, disordered 
amalgamations that transgress not just good taste but good sense. 
They are dangerous. They are exciting, transcendent, exuberant, 
even liberating. They dwell on the border between cultures, 
between living and dead, between organic and inorganic, between 
natural and artificial, between now and the future, and in doing so 
they obscure, and reify, these very boundaries. (195)
It is the reification of these boundaries that is key to a discussion of the current
state of the cyborg. The issue is not so much the obscuring of these borders as
about the maintenance of them that challenges evoke.
It is also necessary to keep in mind that all technologies can be used for
good and/or evil. Gray (1995) elaborates:
The same technology that will hardwire a pilot into the computer 
that flies the jet and enables the missiles will allow our friend, hit by 
a speeding truck, to walk again. There is no choice between utopia 
and dystopia, good Terminator or Evil Terminator - they are both 
here. (465; see also Kroker, 1993:40-41)
Technology, when annexed to the human body, has implications that extend
beyond an individual body. The existence of humans in the world impacts upon
that world. But before it can extend outward to the world, there are implications
for the traditional ways of thinking about the interaction of the various elements
of the human. Rushing and Frentz (1995) explain that "the mind/body dichotomy
of modernism gives way to the postmodem frf-chotomy of mind/body/machine,
and the mind and the body, once fighting a Cartesian battle for preeminence, are
now both vulnerable to annexation by technology" (14).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
116
Conclusion
This is bound up with the, at times, frightening relationships that humans
have with their machines. Don DeLillo, in his novel l4/7?/fe A/o/se (1985), includes
a scene in which the protagonist. Jack, and a colleague, Murray, are discussing
the fact that Jack may be dying as a result of exposure to environmental
effluents. He is unsure of what to do, and Murray offers this advice:
You could put your faith in technology. It got you here, it can get 
you out. This is the whole point of technology. It creates an 
appetite for immortality on the one hand. It threatens universal 
extinction on the other. Technology is lust removed from nature 
[...] It's what we invented to conceal the terrible secret of our 
decaying bodies. But it's also life, isn't it? It prolongs life, it 
provides new organs for those that wear out. New devices, new 
techniques everyday. Lasers, masers, ultrasound. Give yourself 
up to it. Jack. Believe in it. (285)
The belief in technology brings us, perhaps, almost full circle, back to the faith in
the benefits of technology that seemed to abound in the earliest of the three
areas examined in this project. It is also this faith that has allowed the question
of the cyborg to come into being by permitting new technologies to proliferate to
the point where they are indeed a part of everyday human life. But does this
mean that they have become a part of the human body such that it is no longer
possible to distinguish human from machine? The answer that this thesis
attempted to support is no. There remain differences that are, at present and in
the areas examined, insurmountable. There is no doubting that humans and
machines are tied to one another, but they are not united, showing only one face
to the world. Instead, they exist and grow together in a symbiotic relationship
(see Dyens, 2001 and Pepperell 1995), at least for the present.
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